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 Teacher quality has a significant impact on both student learning gains and later life 
outcomes. With this is mind, policymakers implement reforms to attract and retain more 
effective educators. A major obstacle for designing these policies is that the ingredients for 
training, as well as initially identifying, effective teachers remain largely a mystery. However, 
there are strong theoretical arguments for certain education policy reforms producing 
improvements in the quality of the teacher workforce. One increasingly popular example is 
performance-based pay. Performance pay has the potential to better align teachers’ incentives to 
produce increases in student achievement. Paying teachers based on students’ learning gains, 
rather than years of experience, increases lifetime earnings for effective teachers which could 
attract and retain higher-caliber educators. However, since performance-based pay programs 
rarely last longer than a few years and tend to be small in scale, researchers have not been able to 
evaluate how changing the compensation structure affects the composition of the teacher 
workforce.  
 I provide preliminary evidence for how implementing a performance-based pay program 
could impact the teacher workforce. Based on analyses from three studies, I conclude that 
individuals who enter the teaching profession are significantly more risk averse than individuals 
entering other professions. This finding supports a common stereotype about teachers and 
possibly provides an explanation for their resistances to education reforms such as merit pay, 
even when such policies are fairly popular with the rest of the general public. In a follow-up 
study, the preferences of teachers with a preference for performance-based pay are compared to 
those of other teachers. The hypothesis of this study is that changing a central component of 





The evidence from this study is inconclusive but suggests that performance pay might alter the 
composition of the teacher workforce by either attracting more risk-loving teachers to the 
classroom or deterring relatively risk-averse individuals from entering the profession. Finally, I 
link teachers’ risk and performance pay preferences to measures of teacher quality. I find that 
teachers who are the least supportive of performance pay are actually more effective in the 
classroom. This result contradicts the argument that a compositional shift from performance-
based pay will necessarily improve teacher quality. This finding is somewhat counterintuitive but 
is possibly explained by prior research on the negative relationship between intrinsic or mission-
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Arguably the most important issue in public education in the United States today is 
teacher quality. While policymakers and school administrators have tried everything from 
increasing funds to reducing class sizes to improving classroom technology, researchers 
consistently find that the most critical school input for students’ success is the quality of their 
teacher. Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2011) conclude that the value of having teachers who 
are one standard deviation above the median in terms of value-added scores brings about an 
additional $25,000 to a child’s lifetime earnings. Hanushek (2002) argues that very effective 
teachers produce as much as an additional year of learning for their students compared to 
ineffective educators. U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan has been very vocal in 
emphasizing the importance of teachers; “Teachers are central to every single community in 
America. Each day, teachers come to school ready to tackle a job that is critically important, 
extraordinarily complex, often joyful, and, at times, heartbreaking. In essence, teachers help 
others to become their best selves and I can think of no more important work” (2013). Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the issue of attracting and retaining high-caliber individuals to the teacher 
workforce has captivated education stakeholders. 
Even though the importance of teacher quality is widely accepted, researchers and 
policymakers have struggled to find answers for how to identify and attract more effective 
educators. Some of the more commonly used teacher quality screens tend to be inadequate. 
Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008) demonstrate that teacher certification has a very small impact 
on teacher quality in terms of students’ achievement gains. Hanushek, Rivkin, Rothstein, and 
Podgursky (2004) find the same to be true for a master’s degree in education. In his overview of 




concludes that teacher education and experience fail to consistently predict effectiveness for 
teachers with a few years of experience. One notable exception from Hanushek’s (1997) findings 
is the positive relationship between teacher IQ and test score gains, but screen or retention 
policies explicitly focused on teacher intelligence are relatively nonexistent beyond the 
requirement of earning a bachelor’s degree. 
An initial step for addressing this issue, the attempt to build fair and consistent measures 
of teacher effectiveness, has proven to be a major endeavor. The Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation has invested over $45 million in the Measures of Effective Teaching Project to find 
predictors of student learning. While there is considerable debate about whether this study’s 
findings have produced a valid means for identifying more effective teachers (e.g. Greene, 2013; 
West, 2013), there is less controversy with regard to the argument that these findings do not 
provide much guidance for how to actually attract and train more effective teachers (Hyslop, 
2013). 
Despite the challenges associated with identifying effective teachers, education 
policymakers have designed and implemented reforms that aim to improve the caliber of the 
teacher workforce. One example of this type of reform is a proposal to shift away from a 
compensation format that rewards teachers for years of experience (i.e. step and lane pay scales) 
and move towards basing salaries more on student achievement. The theoretical argument for 
this reform is based on the position that paying for outputs rather than inputs should better align 
teachers’ incentives to produce increases in student achievement (Dee & Keys, 2004; Springer et 
al., 2010). The primary objective of performance pay is to strengthen this alignment of incentives 
by increasing the motivations for teachers to work harder to improve student learning (Besley & 




should also facilitate improvements in the composition of the workforce (Ballou & Podgursky, 
1995). If effectiveness is rewarded over experience, then effective teachers have the potential for 
higher lifetime earnings. The potential for higher lifetime earnings likely attracts individuals with 
higher wage-earning skillsets which should improve the overall composition of the teacher 
workforce (Lazear, 2000). 
The literature on performance pay policies has generally focused almost entirely on 
whether financial incentives lead to significant increases in current teachers’ motivations that 
then lead to improved student outcomes (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). The major obstacle that 
prevents studies on such a policy’s impact on the workforce composition is the fact that teacher 
performance-based pay programs are often too small in scale or too short in duration to 
significantly alter the teacher labor pool. One exception is Woessmann’s (2011) examination of 
the relationships between countries’ international test score performances and the formats of 
their teacher compensation policies. Controlling for demographics, Woessmann finds that there 
is a positive, significant relationship between the degree to which a more performance-based pay 
structure is used and student performance in both math and reading. However, Woessmann 
concludes that although this finding is significant and substantial, it does not demonstrate a 
causal relationship. 
I hope to add to this literature by examining the relationships between teachers’ 
characteristics and pay preferences and analyzing how these attributes could affect teachers’ 
responses to the implementation of a performance-based pay program. I investigate these 
relationships by addressing three separate research questions. 
The first article evaluates whether individuals who select into the teaching profession 




primary goal of this article is to assess the validity of the stereotype that teachers are relatively 
risk averse. Finding evidence that individuals who select into teaching are more risk averse could 
have significant implications with regard to the implementation of a performance-based pay 
program. First, if more risk-averse individuals are not amenable to performance-based pay 
policies, then the pursuits of radically restructuring the format for teacher compensation could 
have substantial political costs. Second, greater financial incentives are typically needed to get 
employee buy-in and cooperation for more risk-averse individuals. In other words, to offset the 
strong, negative fears of ambiguity that come with performance-based pay, programs would 
almost certainly have to provide bigger rewards in order to achieve their desired outcomes than 
would be necessary for a more risk-neutral population. Finally, if individuals entering the 
profession are generally more risk averse, then this would suggest that teacher risk aversion is 
not solely a product of socialization. 
The next article attempts to determine whether the shift from the more traditional step 
and lane pay schedules to performance-based pay attracts more risk-loving teachers. In this 
study, the risk preferences of teachers who chose to work at schools during the implementation 
of a performance-based pay program are compared to the other teachers at these schools 
(including those hired before the program’s implementation as well as those hired after the 
program was discontinued). The goal of this article is to build upon the findings from the first 
article and see whether pay and risk preferences are related. If performance-based pay attracts 
individuals with significantly different risk preferences, then the implication might be that 
changing the format of teacher pay would alter the composition of the workforce. The change in 




individuals with significantly different characteristics reflects that compensation format can play 
a major role in who is ultimately attracted to entering the field.  
The last article examines whether pay and risk preferences are significantly related to 
measures of teacher quality. Teachers’ responses from the second study are linked to their 
students’ test score gains in addition to the performance evaluations that their principals provide 
at the end of each school year. The primary objective of this article is to provide evidence for 
whether there might be cause for hope or concern with regard to the type of compositional shift 
that could take place in the event of a substantial change to the format of teacher compensation. 
If there is a positive relationship between teachers’ preferences with regard to performance pay 
and their effectiveness as educators, then this study would provide evidence for this reform 
plausibly improving teacher quality. However, if there is a negative or even null relationship, 
then performance-based pay policies might lead to greater costs than benefits at least with regard 
to their compositional effects. Moreover, a negative relationship between teacher effectiveness 
and preference for performance-based pay might signify a conflict between motivations for 
teaching and the influences that financial incentives have on teachers.    
With performance-based pay programs being relatively small in scale and duration at this 
time, circumstances make it difficult to address these questions with research in the field. 
Therefore, the data collection for these studies took place in a more laboratory-like setting. This 
type of approach is fairly uncommon in current education policy research. However, the 
increasing influence of experimental and behavioral economics in other public policy arenas (e.g. 
Birol, Karousakis, & Koundouri, 2006; Gowdy, 2008; Lancsar & Louviere, 2008) might serve as 




Jabbar (2011) argues that controlled laboratory settings provide a useful means for developing 
new hypotheses that can be later tested in the field. 
In order to measure and compare individuals’ risk preferences, 132 teacher candidates 
and then 120 different teachers from two different school districts participated in the Holt and 
Laury (2002) experimental task. The Holt and Laury (2002) risk-elicitation task is commonly 
used in the field of experimental economics and has the benefit of providing means for 
conducting both absolute and relative measures of individual risk preferences. All of the 
participants also completed surveys in order to provide demographic information that is used to 
analyze how participants’ characteristics and backgrounds potentially influence risk and pay 
preferences. I also received permission from administrators of the two school districts to obtain 
the names of the participants from the later study. I link their responses to the districts’ teacher 
performance data, including teachers’ student test score gains and the ratings on their end of the 
year performance evaluations. 
Overall, I find that individuals who want to go into teaching are significantly more risk 
averse than individuals with similar educational backgrounds whom are entering other, non-
teaching professions. Prospective teachers do not have a greater aversion or propensity for 
performance-based pay; however, this finding is possibly attributed to these individuals not 
having options to distinguish their preferences for certain types of pay. More specifically, 
compensation formats were not presented in this study as tradeoffs.  
I also find that teachers who “truly seek out performance-based pay” are significantly 
more risk loving than other teachers. I identify teachers as seeking out performance-based pay as 
those teachers employed at a time when the merit pay system was in place. When analyzing 




in risk preference. However, this finding could be attributed to the fact that the merit pay aspect 
was an afterthought. Therefore, I run additional analyses where true performance-pay seekers are 
identified as those having opted in as well as indicating that the merit pay program was “a 
deciding factor” in their employment decision. This finding however is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels due to such a small sample of teachers designated as being 
truly drawn to performance-based pay.  
Finally, I find that a teacher’s inclinations towards a more performance-based pay system 
as well as the degree to which they are risk loving are both negatively related to teacher 
effectiveness in terms of value-added measures. This finding is especially perplexing given the 
fact that the most effective teachers would seemingly benefit from having pay based on student 
performance. There is no significant relationship between teachers’ preferences and their ratings 
on the end of the year performance evaluations. This evidence could serve as an important caveat 
for policymakers. Changing the structure of teacher compensation may have unintended 
consequences. If the most effective teachers are opposed to performance-based pay, then 
implementing this type of policy could make it more difficult to retain these teachers. Moreover, 
this finding could assert the possibility that mission orientation or intrinsic motivation is 
positively related to teacher quality. In other words, high quality teachers could be more likely to 
find that financial incentives crowd out or conflict with their motives for teaching, and even 
though they benefit the most financially from this compensation format, they might grow to 
resent performance pay the most. This explanation is purely hypothetical but perhaps the 
relationships between teachers’ motivations, efficacy, and perspectives, should be further 




 The remainder of this dissertation is divided up into four sections, consisting of three 
separate articles and a conclusion. The second through fourth sections are the separate articles 
that examine the three research questions that guide this dissertation. The second section 
examines the question of whether individuals who go into the teaching profession are 
significantly more risk averse than individuals with similar educational backgrounds selecting 
into other professions. The third section investigates whether performance-based pay could alter 
the composition of the teacher workforce. The fourth section links teachers’ risk and survey 
responses to their value-added scores and year-end performance evaluations to analyze whether 
pay and risk preferences predict measures of teacher quality. Finally, the last section summarizes 
the findings of these three articles, provides some policy implications, describes some of the 
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Risky Business: An Analysis of Teacher Risk Preferences 
By: Daniel H. Bowen, Stuart Buck, Cary Deck, Jonathan N. Mills, & James V. Shuls   
Abstract 
Teachers tend to oppose policy reforms aimed at improving teacher effectiveness. One 
potential explanation for their objections is that teachers, as a group, are relatively risk averse. 
This paper addresses this explanation through the use of a risk preference elicitation task 
commonly used in experimental economics. Comparing the risk preferences of future teachers 
with those entering other professions, we find that individuals selecting into teaching careers are 
significantly more risk averse. At the same time, we do not find evidence that compensation 
format preferences are independently responsible for attracting more risk-averse individuals into 
teaching, as risk aversion does not appear to correlate with a stated preference for a particular 
compensation format. We believe that policymakers need to take into account teachers’ risk 
characteristics when considering policy changes that may clash with teacher preferences. 
Introduction 
Research has demonstrated that an effective teacher can significantly increase how much 
students learn in the classroom (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011; Hanushek, 1992). In fact, 
the difference between an effective and ineffective teacher could be as much as an extra year of 
learning for students (Hanushek, 2002). However, while private sector workers are more 
commonly paid according to on-the-job performance, most American teacher salaries are 
determined by a single salary schedule, often referred to as a “step and lane” pay scale. First 
introduced in 1921, by 1950 roughly 97% of all schools in the United States adopted a step and 
lane pay schedule (Prostik, 1996). Currently, the vast majority of K-12 teachers in a school 




rewarding teachers for student performance, step and lane pay schedules offer salary increases 
for each year of service and for additional coursework, typically college credit hours or advanced 
degrees. Therefore, under this pay scheme, a highly effective teacher and a highly ineffective 
teacher, who begin teaching in the same school at the same time, will earn the exact same salary. 
While step and lane salary schedules have been the norm in public education for nearly 
six decades, there has been a recent push to reform teacher pay. Secretary of Education Arne 
Duncan and President Obama have publicly supported the development of merit pay systems for 
teachers. The Department of Education has established a grant program, the Teacher Incentive 
Fund, that supports the development of performance-based compensation systems. Paying 
teachers based on their performances has also grown in popularity with the general public. In a 
recent public opinion poll, 47% of those surveyed favor “paying teachers, in part, based on the 
academic progress of their students on state tests,” while only 27% were opposed to merit pay 
(Howell, West, & Peterson, 2011, p. 14). However, the same poll finds that 72% of teachers 
oppose performance-based pay. 
There are many reasons why teachers might oppose a more performance-based incentive 
scheme. A step and lane scale may contribute to a steady workforce by encouraging individuals 
to remain in the profession throughout their career. A stable pay scale might also enable teachers 
to experiment with new and potentially innovative teaching techniques that they might not try 
otherwise. Teachers might fear that merit pay could bring about a more acute focus on a narrow 
academic element of schooling to the detriment of other valuable areas (Wilms & Chapleau, 
1999). Teachers may also worry about the reliability of tests to accurately measure student 




performance may reduce the incentives for teachers to collaborate with one another and could 
even cause conflict (Ritter & Jensen, 2010).  
Another plausible, yet relatively unexplored, explanation for teacher opposition is that 
individuals who go into teaching may be relatively more risk averse than the general population. 
Studies in a variety of fields have noted that compensation schemes impact workforce 
composition (e.g. Dohmen & Falk, 2011; Lazear, 2000). Relative to private sector employees, 
teachers receive lower average pay but have less pay variability and more generous health 
benefits, pensions, and job security (Podgursky, 2003). These features of the compensation 
system could entice relatively risk-averse individuals into the profession. If teachers are in fact 
more risk averse than other workers, teacher opposition to performance pay systems is 
unsurprising. 
In this paper, we explore teachers’ risk preferences using a lottery-based risk elicitation 
tool common to the experimental economics literature. Using responses on this task, we compare 
the risk attitudes of future teachers with the risk preferences of students in master of business 
administration (MBA) and juris doctorate (JD) programs. By focusing on graduate students 
preparing to enter teaching and other professional careers, we can focus on the issue of self-
selection into a career while eliminating affects that experiences in these professions might have 
on preferences. We also survey participants on key demographic information, as well as their 
likelihoods of going into teaching, and their preferences for four different types of pay systems: 







Public sector jobs often come with tenure or civil service protections that are far more 
protective than the employment-at-will relationships pervasive in the private sector. 
Unsurprisingly, economists have long found that public sector workers tend to be more risk 
averse than private sector workers (e.g. Dohmen et al., 2005; Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, & 
Jonker, 2002; Masclet, Colombier, Denant-Boemont, & Loheac, 2009). Bellante and Link (1981) 
find that risk aversion, measured from survey responses, is a significant predictor of public sector 
employment. Buurman, Delfgaauw, Dur, and Van den Bossche (2012) find that public sector 
workers’ odds of choosing a riskier reward for filling out a survey are only slightly more than 
half of that of a private sector worker.  
As for the risk aversion of teachers in particular, previous work has been anecdotal (e.g. 
Wagner, 2001) or based on survey data lacking salient rewards (e.g. Davis, 1994). One exception 
is Perez (2011) who compares the risk preferences, attitudes towards pay inequity, and 
preferences toward competition of female teacher candidates to female law students. In the 
study, subjects were asked to complete a series of 10-minute rounds of solving mazes with 
different pay schemes. In the final round, some participants were randomly asked to choose 
which pay scheme they would prefer. The other participants were asked to make the same 
decision, except that they were told that one of their decisions (randomly determined) would 
apply to the rest of the group.  
Perez finds that teachers do not exhibit higher levels of risk aversion than the lawyers 
because they are no more or less likely to choose performance-based compensation when 
determining the pay format that only applies to them. However, teachers were significantly more 




else, teachers are much less likely to opt for performance-based pay. Perez claims that these 
results suggest that teachers have fundamental inclinations towards greater pay equity and that 
policymakers should take this inclination into consideration. 
While our study is closely related to Perez’s, it differs in a few ways. First, we include 
males in our sample. Even though the majority of teachers are women, we want to expand our 
analyses to also include men drawn to the teaching profession. Second, we use individuals’ 
choices with regard to different lotteries in order to elicit risk preferences. Finally, we examine 
whether there is a significant relationship between individuals’ risk preferences and their 
preferences for different forms of compensation. In the next section, we introduce the risk-
elicitation instrument and outline our experimental procedure. Then, we present our results with 
regard to differences in risk preferences and whether these related to surveyed preferences for 
different compensation formats. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of our results and their 
potential implications. 
Methods 
Risk Elicitation Task 
To measure the risk attitudes of future teachers relative to the participants in the MBA 
and JD programs, we use the Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference task. This tool is a well-
known, commonly used risk-elicitation procedure in the experimental economics literature (e.g. 
Anderson, Harrison, Lau, & Rutstrom, 2008; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde, 2010; Eckel & 
Wilson, 2004). While there are alternative controlled procedures for measuring risk, this 
procedure has become a generally accepted standard. In part this is due to the ease with which it 




Rutstrom (2005) have found this procedure to have high retest reliability over an extended time 
frame.  
The procedure, shown in Table 1 as it was presented to participants, estimates risk 
preferences by examining subject choices between lotteries with different real dollar payouts. In 
particular, subjects are asked to choose between two options (A and B) for each of 10 lotteries 
with the understanding that they will receive the outcome from one particular lottery chosen at 
random. The possible payouts are held fixed for each option, with Option A payoffs ($4.80 or 
$6.00) having less variability than Option B payoffs ($0.30 or $11.55). The chance of receiving 
the higher of the two payouts for either option increases by 10 percentage points with each 
lottery. In Lottery 10, a participant is guaranteed to receive the larger payoff amount from the 
selected option and thus should strictly prefer the $11.55 from Option B to the $6.00 from 
Option A.  
Risk preferences are modeled using a constant relative risk aversion functional form of 
utility,  ( )         where individual utility is a function of payout x and their risk preference 
parameter r. In this framework, individuals are classed into one of three groups based on the 
value of r: risk averse (r>0), risk neutral (r=0), and risk preferring(r<0). Individuals with r=0 are 
considered risk neutral because their utility is solely determined by their expected payout. In 
contrast, individuals with r>0 are risk averse as their utility down-weights the expected payout 
because (1-r) <1 when r>0. Finally, r<0 is associated with risk loving preferences as such 
individuals prefer increased uncertainty.  
The switching point from Option A to Option B identifies a range of risk parameters that 
are consistent with the observed choice (Holt & Laury, 2002). It is conceivable that an extremely 




cause people to select Option B for choice 10 because one is assured of receiving the higher 
payoff. A risk-neutral individual is concerned with the expected payouts from the two options in 
a given lottery and will choose Option A for the first four lotteries and Option B for the 
remaining lotteries. Risk-averse individuals are willing to forgo expected value in exchange for 
reduced uncertainty and therefore will continue choosing Option A even after the fourth lottery 
despite the higher expected payout from Option B. Risk-loving individuals will make the switch 
to Option B before the fifth lottery despite the higher expected payout from Option A.  
The Holt and Laury (2002) procedure not only provides rich information on individual 
preferences, it also allows us to check the extent to which subject confusion exists in our data: 
individuals should never select Option A on Lottery X after having selected Option B for Lottery 
Y if X>Y. Therefore multiple switches serve as one indicator of participant confusion. 
Risk Task Procedures 
A total of 132 subjects completed the study, all of whom were graduate students at a 
major, public university in the southeast region of the United States. Our group of interest 
consisted of 65 prospective teachers recruited from the university’s Master’s in the Art of 
Teaching (MAT) Program. Of these, 32% were studying to teach at the elementary level while 
68% were studying to teach at the middle or secondary level. The students spend an academic 
year taking coursework while student teaching at traditional public schools. Upon completion of 
the program, students become certified teachers in the state. We chose MAT students, as 
opposed to undergraduates with declared education majors, because of the greater certainty that 
these students will ultimately end up teaching in the near future. In fact, according to a 




students accept teaching positions in the academic year immediately following the completion of 
the program.  
The MAT program is the only route a student at this particular university can take to earn 
a traditional teaching license. Future elementary teachers can earn a bachelor's degree in 
education, while middle and secondary teachers typically first earn a bachelor's degree in their 
content areas. Therefore, while education undergraduates are almost entirely elementary 
education majors, MAT students represent a more even distribution of elementary, middle, and 
high school teachers. 
The comparison group for this study is composed of graduate students in other fields. In 
particular, future teachers are compared to 43 students in the university’s MBA program in 
addition to 24 JD students. We chose these students to serve as a comparison group because they 
are similarly pursuing professional graduate degrees. 
To conduct the study, we obtained permission from university faculty to offer their 
students the opportunity to participate in a paid research study on economic decision making. 
The experiments were conducted during the last fifteen minutes of class. Instructors were asked 
to leave the room prior to the study and participants were aware that their responses would be 
kept anonymous. The students were not made aware of the opportunity to participate in the study 
prior to our arrival. After the instructor left, we briefly described the experiment and reviewed 
the participation consent form that subjects would be required to sign in order to receive 
payment. Students were free to leave at any point as participation was voluntary.
1
  
Participants were then given a single, two-sided sheet of paper with instructions for the 
experiment. This document contained a sample question to verify if the participant understood 
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 Only two potential subjects opted not to participate; one male and one female in the JD 




the experiment, the risk preference elicitation instrument, and a survey of compensation 
preferences as well as demographic questions (see Appendix). Participants were told to read the 
directions, complete a comprehension question, and then raise their hands so that one of the 
monitors could verify that the subject understood how the elicitation procedure worked before 
completing the task. If the subject completed the sample question correctly, the monitor 
discreetly marked the form in a particular location on the paper. If the subject had answered 
incorrectly and needed additional explanation, the monitor discreetly marked the form in a 
different location. This process allowed us to track which subjects experienced at least some 
initial confusion about the task.  
After an experimenter checked the comprehension question and verified that the 
participant understood the instructions, the participant was asked to complete the risk elicitation 
task and then complete a brief survey on the other side (see Appendix). Participants were aware 
the survey existed when completing the risk-elicitation tool, but they were unaware of the 
survey’s contents. The survey was completed after the lottery in order to avoid the possibility 
that these questions could frame or influence subjects’ behaviors while listing their lottery 
preferences. 
The first half of the survey asked participants about their preferences for four different 
pay system scenarios. We used the same scenarios that Milanowski (2007) used to survey 
students who were preparing to become teachers. We asked participants, on a scale of -4 (highly 
undesirable) to +4 (highly desirable), to indicate how desirable or undesirable they would find 
each particular pay format for their first chosen occupation. The four formats were pay for 
individual performance, pay for the development of knowledge and skills, pay for team 




The last part of the survey included questions about background information to control 
for other potentially salient characteristics. Specifically, we collected information on each 
participant’s age, gender,
 
proxies for income level, mother’s level of education, and the 
individual’s estimated likelihood that they would ever enter the teaching force.
2
 Our proxies for 
wealth include the make and model of a participant’s car and how many times they eat at a 
restaurant in a given week. We used these proxies rather than asking for current income level, 




Upon completion of the study, participants brought their response forms to the front of 
the room. Monitors verified that subjects had completed all of the questions and then rolled a 
ten-sided die to determine which lottery choice would be used to determine the subject’s 
payment.
4
 Next, the ten-sided die was rolled again to determine the actual payment according to 
the subject’s choice of Option A or B for the randomly chosen lottery. On average, participants 
in the experiment received a payment of $7.00. After subjects received their payments, they were 
dismissed from the study and then exited the room. There was no identifying link between the 
payment record and the participants’ response forms in order to preserve their anonymity.  
  
                                                     
2
 The latter variable was collected to verify that one’s degree program was a reliable proxy of 
career intentions. 
3
 In other words,  these approaches seem to more accurate measure of a participant’s wealth than 
having them self-report income levels. A graduate student could potentially report no salary due 
to their student status, but others might include family and/or parents’ income levels in their 
responses without us being able to distinguish how the participant approached this question. 
4
 Randomly selecting one task for payment is a common approach in experiments where the 





In this section we present both the risk task and survey results. Before examining 
differences in behavior between prospective teachers and other students, we compare the 
composition of the two groups. To make sure that the two groups accurately distinguish 
individuals who are most likely to teach from those who will not, we asked how likely the 
participants were to teach in a K-12 setting. More than 97% of MAT students indicated there was 
greater than a 75% chance they would enter teaching with 60% stating the likelihood was 100%. 
In comparison, only 3% of non-MAT students indicated there was greater than a 75% chance 
that they would teach, while more than 89% indicated there was less than a 25% chance. These 
responses give us confidence that the participants in our study accurately capture future teachers 
and other professionals not likely to work in education.  
Table 2 provides summary demographic information for the MAT and non-MAT 
samples. The overall sample consists of mostly female participants, but males represent a 
majority among non-MAT students. White participants are the overwhelming majority in the 
MAT sample, and the non-MAT sample is more diverse. In addition to simple demographics, we 
examined the extent to which the MAT and non-MAT samples varied on wealth proxies. In 
general, the two samples did not significantly differ on level of mother’s education, number of 
days they ate out in a given week, or with the Blue Book value of their personal vehicles.  
Our experimental procedures provided us with two opportunities to ascertain individual 
confusion with the risk elicitation tool. First, after having participants read through the 
instructions, we had them answer a question on a hypothetical payout. The second test of 
comprehension is whether the individual made consistent responses (i.e. as opposed to making 




answers to the comprehension question and percentages of students with consistent responses on 
the risk elicitation tool. When comparing the overall percentages of confusion in the MAT and 
non-MAT groups, we find no statistically significant difference between the groups. 
We present the results of our study in terms of risk preferences and pay preferences. 
These results include all individuals from our study; we do not limit our analyses to only those 
participants who lacked any difficulty comprehending the risk task. This allows us to utilize our 
full data set. We have also conducted the same analyses both controlling for and excluding 
individuals that exhibited confusion. While point estimates differ between the two sets of 




In Table 4, we present a comparison of the average number of times an individual went 
with the “safer” (i.e. lower payout variance) choice, Option A. On average, participants make 4.7 
safe choices. MAT students, on average, make 5 safe choices while non-MAT students make 4.3. 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the proportion of individuals making safe choices in each 
lottery for MAT and non-MAT students. The dotted line serves as a reference, indicating how a 
perfectly risk-neutral group would respond to the risk-elicitation tool. Consistent with the 
comparison of averages in Table 4, Figure 1 indicates non-MAT students are more willing to 
take risks. For example, in lottery 5 (where a risk-neutral individual would first make a switch 
away from the safer choice), 39% of non-MAT, as opposed to 60% of MAT students, chose the 
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 The only changes in significance that take place are in 2 of the 12 analyses. The coefficient for 
MAT is always positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in 10 of these 12 
analyses and always for models 1, 2, and 3. However, when removing participants that did not 
initially get the initial item check correct, the coefficient on MAT is 0.90 (p = 0.11) in the 4
th
 
model when controlling for the number of times that a participant eats out in a given week 
(wealth proxy 2). When removing any participants that demonstrated confusion in terms of 
switching options more than once, the coefficient on MAT is 0.91 (p = 0.12) in the 3
rd
 model 




safer option. The greater willingness of non-MAT students to take risks is supported by a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that compares these two distributions (p-value < 0.01). The central 
tendencies of the two distributions also differ based upon a Mann-Whitney test (p-value < 0.01). 
Since our sample of future teachers is mostly female, a gender effect may be driving our 
main result. Figure 2 presents a comparison of outcomes for females and males. The strong 
similarities between the male and female distributions suggest a lack of a gender effect. The 
Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests both support this conclusion as they fail to find a 
significant gender effect (p-values = 0.79 and 0.67, respectively). This finding may seem 
counterintuitive as prior research has found women to be more risk averse than men (e.g. Eckel 
& Grossman, 2008; Schubert, Gysler, Brown, & Brachinger, 1999). Nevertheless, there are also 
experimental studies that have found no significant gender differences in risk behavior (e.g. 
Harbaugh, Krause, & Vesterlund, 2002; Moore & Eckel, 2003).  
We also examine results of gender differences within degree program in Figure 3. While 
non-MAT males do not appear to strongly differ from non-MAT females, there appears to be a 
gap between MAT males and females, with males significantly choosing the safer choice more 
often on average. Among males in the MAT program, 63% made 6 safe choices or more 
indicating a high degree of risk aversion. Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject 
the null hypothesis of similar distributions between male MAT and both female MAT and male 
non-MAT participants (see Table 5).  
In addition to comparing the number of safe choices by each group, we conduct 
regression analyses to examine the risk attitudes between those in the two degree programs while 
controlling for other demographic variables. Table 6 reports the results of four different 




examines only the relationship between degree program and risk aversion. While the second 
through fourth specifications include additional covariates such as gender, race, age, income, and 
confusion, MAT program enrollment is the only variable that predicts risk attitude. In the first 
specification, MAT program enrollment is associated with participants choosing an average of 
0.70 more safe choices (Option A). This result holds when we additionally control for gender in 
the second specification: MAT program enrollment is associated with significantly more safe 
choices; however gender has no significant impact on the number of safe choices. 
In the third specification, we include gender interacted with the MAT program as well as 
indicators for race, age, and whether a subject experienced confusion in interpreting the lottery 
task. Males in the MAT program make 1.03 more safe choices than non-MAT males (p = 0.05). 
Additionally, we compare female MAT and non-MAT student risk preferences by examining the 
statistical significance of the sum of the MAT and Female*MAT coefficients. A joint F-test 
rejects the hypothesis that these coefficients sum to zero (p = 0.08). Finally, we can examine if 
there is a gender difference in the number of safe choices among MAT students by testing the 
statistical significance of the sum of the Female and Female*MAT coefficients. A joint F-test 
fails to reject the hypothesis that these coefficients sum to zero (p = 0.57). Thus, MAT status is 
significantly related to making more safe choices when examining different subgroups and 
controlling for demographics. While MAT males still appear to be the most risk averse subgroup, 
they are not significantly more risk averse than MAT females.  
In the fourth specification, we include a host of variables that attempt to control for 
student wealth. In particular, we include three wealth proxies: the log of participant car Blue 
Book values; the number of times the participant reports to eat at a restaurant in a given week; 




wealth separately as these measures are likely highly correlated. The findings from the other 
model specifications remain unchanged. Specifically, we find no significant differences in risk 
preferences based on an individual's wealth as measured by our proxies. The coefficients for 
MAT, gender, age, etc. marginally change. However, each coefficient does not change with 
regard to direction or significance. 
In summary, the results from our analyses of individual risk-preferences indicate that 
future teachers in our sample are significantly more risk averse than other graduate students. This 
result holds when we disaggregate by gender: both male and female MAT students are 
significantly more risk averse than respective non-MAT counterparts. At the same time, we do 
not find significant differences in risk preferences among male and female MAT students. These 
results hold when we control for additional individual demographics. In the next section, we 
examine the extent to which these estimated differences in risk preferences correspond to 
differences in preferences for performance-based compensation schemes. 
Pay Preferences 
Table 7 describes the average ratings given to each pay system, broken out by group and 
gender. Overall, there was relatively strong support for individual merit pay based on objective 
performance as well as based on one’s development of knowledge and skills. MAT students 
were significantly less supportive of team-based pay (K-S p-value = 0.03; M-W p-value < 0.01). 
We also have dichotomized participants’ preferences in order to examine the percentage within 
each group who generally support the different types of pay systems. MAT students are still 
found to be significantly less likely to support pay for team performance. MAT students are also 
less likely to support pay for individual performance and pay for developing their knowledge and 




However, these differences fail to achieve traditionally accepted levels of statistical significance. 
Finally, there is little to no correlation between these participants’ risk and pay system 
preferences.  
The strong overall support for individual merit pay might seem anomalous, especially in 
the case of risk-averse individuals. This might be because our survey question described 
individual merit pay as the potential to earn a pay increase (i.e. a bonus). It is plausible then that 
even risk-averse individuals would be supportive of the chance to earn a pay raise when there is 
no risk of wage loss. Moreover, the prospect of pay for performance for a novice teacher is 
possibly not perceived as being all that risky. Moreover, one potential shortcoming of the design 
for this section of the survey is that we are not able to observe how these participants necessarily 
perceive these different pay formats in relation to one another. Perhaps having the participants 
choose the extent to which they would prefer individual versus team pay or performance-based 
versus automatic raises would have provided more useful information at least for comparing 
these groups’ pay preferences. In the following section we summarize our findings and discuss 
their implications. 
Discussion & Conclusion 
We conduct an experiment that allows us to ascertain relative risk preferences for 
individuals in a MAT program and a comparison group of MBA and law students. Our results 
show clear evidence that those who opt to pursue teaching careers are more risk averse than 
those pursuing careers in business or law. However, based on the survey responses of our 
participants, it does not appear as though an early preference for step and lane pay (or an 
aversion to performance-based pay) systems can independently explain why more risk-averse 




Support for the notion that teachers tend to be risk averse could have important 
implications for education policymakers. Buurman et al. (2012) note that if public employees are 
more risk averse, “pay-for-performance is a more costly instrument to induce effort in the public 
sector than in the private sector” (p. 4). Similarly, implementing performance pay may increase 
the levels of tension and worker dissatisfaction (Dohmen & Falk, 2010; Perez, 2011). 
Specifically, this disapproval could be attributed to the possibility that the profession has 
attracted individuals who are relatively risk averse.  
In our sample, both future teachers and the comparison group preferred merit pay systems 
more than they preferred a uniform pay raise system which is commonly used in education. 
There are at least a couple of reasons why this might be the case for the participants of this study. 
First, if these future teachers are comparing their possible wages under a performance-based pay 
system to what they will receive under the step and lane system, then the former system possibly 
looks more appealing. Early career teachers have the lowest wages in a step and lane pay system 
and may therefore be more likely to prefer performance-based pay because it offers the chance of 
making higher wages with essentially no risk. Milanowski’s (2007) research supports this 
explanation, finding that support for merit pay appears to be more common for less experienced 
than veteran teachers. Future teachers may also overestimate their abilities to be high performers. 
In other words, without evidence to the contrary, MAT students may not find performance-based 
pay to be all that risky if they see themselves as being highly effective teachers. Finally, the 
result may simply be driven by the wording of the survey question, as participants may prefer 
performance pay when it takes the form of a bonus (i.e. no risk of loss).  
There was a significant difference in preference for team-based merit pay plans, with 




for why this might be the case, but we speculate that it could be tied to the nature of their 
prospective professions. The MAT students’ opposition to team performance pay could reflect 
how these future teachers assess their abilities relative to other teachers. In other words, if these 
future teachers believe that they will be better than average, they may view team performance 
pay as undesirable (at least relative to their expected earnings under an individual performance 
pay program). Another possibility is that MBA and law students might be more likely to work 
together on a single project or case. In which case, rewarding workers for the success of the team 
may closely align with the type of work these future employees aspire to do upon entering the 
workforce. Teachers, on the other hand, have just their classroom of students and may have little 
influence over how other teachers perform.  
Limitations 
In addition to our small sample size, our use of a laboratory environment limits the extent 
to which we can make broader, more generalizable claims about all teachers’ risk characteristics. 
Moreover, our sample is restricted to prospective teachers coming from one university. Despite 
these limitations, we hope that our findings build upon as well as facilitate the research on 
teacher characteristics. We believe that incorporating behavioral measures into this body of 
research can help increase our knowledge about the types of individuals who are attracted to the 
teaching profession in addition to a better understanding of the specific aspects of the profession 
that have fostered this attraction. We do not believe that our findings provide any specific policy 
prescriptions. Nevertheless, this research can help inform and caution policymakers going 
forward as they consider ways to attract and retain high quality teachers in addition to positively 






Our findings provide suggestive evidence that future teachers are indeed more risk averse 
than individuals in other professions. At the same time, our survey data do not provide evidence 
supporting the notion that uniform salary schedules or even aversion to performance-based pay is 
solely responsible for attracting these relatively risk-averse individuals to the teaching 
profession. It could be the case that other aspects of teaching are attracting risk-averse 
individuals to the profession. Another possibility is that these future teachers do not view their 
participation in performance-based pay programs as very risky. These views could be due to the 
fact that incoming teachers have relatively little to lose in a step and lane pay system. It could 
also be the case that these future teachers have a high estimate of their likely effectiveness in the 
classroom and therefore see little risk in compensation based on their abilities.   
Although there are many other issues that need to be taken into consideration in terms of 
how these results can shape and influence education policy, this evidence can at least inform 
policy discussions on teacher quality in at least a couple of different ways. For example, our 
results may suggest that policymakers need to take into greater account teachers’ risk preferences 
when designing performance incentives (e.g. performance pay programs). Moreover, these 
findings may suggest that the efficacy of policies could depend more on facilitating systemic 
changes that attract a different pool of individuals into the profession. However, while 
implementing certain reforms could entice less risk-averse individuals into the teaching 
profession as well as deter more risk-averse individuals from entering the profession, the impact 
that this systemic shift would have on student achievement is unknown. 
Future research could compare prospective teachers’ preferences, characteristics, and 




especially like certain aspects of the job might stay in the teaching profession, and those who do 
not care for these aspects eventually leave the profession. In addition, people who teach for 
several years might dislike certain characteristics of the job initially, but they might grow to 
prefer these characteristics over time because of social conformity or because it is a system that 
fundamentally advantages them as they transition to veteran status.  
With regard to systemic changes, future analyses could further explore the nature of 
personnel changes that might occur with the implementation of certain reforms (e.g. examining 
whether performance-based pay or the removal of tenure attracts less risk-averse teacher 
candidates) and assessing if these changes benefit student outcomes. These questions, as well as 
the ones addressed in this research, will hopefully better inform policymakers on important 
considerations when it comes to implementing changes that potentially alter the nature of the 
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Table 1: Lottery Choices  
 
Lottery 
Option A Possible Roll(s) for 
Payout 
Option B 
 Payout Payout  
1.  
$6.00 1 $11.55 
 
$4.80 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
2.  
$6.00 1,2 $11.55 
 
$4.80 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
3.  
$6.00 1,2,3 $11.55 
 
$4.80 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
4.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4 $11.55 
 
$4.80 5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
5.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5 $11.55 
 
$4.80 6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
6.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6 $11.55 
 
$4.80 7,8,9,10 $0.30 
7.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 $11.55 
 
$4.80 8,9,10 $0.30 
8.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 $11.55 
 
$4.80 9,10 $0.30 
9.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 $11.55 
 
$4.80 10 $0.30 
10.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $11.55 
 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Item 
non-MAT MAT Total 
N % N % N % 
Gender 
       
 
Male 41 61.2 16 24.6 57 43.2 
 
Female 26 38.8 49 75.4 75 56.8 
Race/Ethnicity 
      
 
White 46 68.7 62 95.4 108 81.8 
 
Black 5 7.5 --- --- 5 3.8 
 
Asian 12 17.9 --- --- 12 9.1 
 
Hispanic 2 3.0 1 1.5 3 2.3 
  Other 2 3.0 2 3.1 4 3.0 
Mother’s 
Education        
 < H.S. 2 3.0 --- --- 2 1.5 
 H.S. 9 13.4 15 23.1 24 18.2 
 Some College 13 19.4 16 24.6 29 22.0 
 Bachelors 28 41.8 25 38.5 53 40.2 
 Grad. Degree 15 22.4 9 13.4 24 18.2 
Eating Out (per 
week)        
 Never 5 7.5 1 1.5 6 4.6 
 1-2 37 55.2 37 56.9 74 56.1 
 3-4 20 29.9 22 33.9 42 31.8 
 5-6 4 6.0 1 1.5 5 3.8 
 Daily 1 1.5 4 6.2 5 3.8 
Car Value        
 < $1k 12 17.9 5 7.7 17 12.9 
 $1k-$5k  23 34.3 23 35.4 46 34.8 
 $5k-$10k 17 25.4 23 35.4 40 30.3 
 $10k-$15k 8 11.9 6 9.2 14 10.6 
 > $15k 7 10.4 8 12.3 15 11.3 
Note: We test for gender and race/ethnicity differences using a chi-squared test. Participants in 
the MAT group are significantly more likely to be female and white (p-values < 0.01). Using a 
Mann-Whitney two-sample rank-sum test for both mother’s education and number of times 
eating out and a t-test for car values, we find no statistically significant differences between the 














MBA 76.7% 88.4% 74.4% 
Law 91.7% 100% 91.7% 
Elementary MAT 76.2% 85.7% 71.4% 
Secondary MAT 81.4% 90.9% 76.7% 
Non-MAT 82.1% 92.5% 80.6% 











N Average N Average N Average 
non-MAT 








65 5.0 16 5.4 49 4.9 
  (1.9)   (2.1)   (1.8) 





Table 5: Statistical Comparison between Subgroups 
 non-MAT Males MAT Females 
MAT Males 









Note: Reported values are estimated p-values for the Mann-
Whitney (M-W) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests for 





Table 6:  Regression Results for Number of Safe Choices 
 
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MAT 
  0.70** 
(0.29) 
  0.77** 
(0.32) 
































   4.34*** 
(0.20) 
   4.42*** 
(0.24) 




Log Car Value  (Proxy 1)    
-0.04 
(0.06) 
Never Eat Out (Proxy 2)    
-0.57 
(0.76) 
Eat Out 1-2 times (Proxy 2)    
-0.18 
(0.33) 
Eat Out 5-6 times (Proxy 2)    
-0.42 
(0.84) 
Eat Out Daily (Proxy 2)    
-0.83 
(0.83) 
Mother  Edu - Less Than High 
School (Proxy 3) 
   
0.93 
(1.32) 
Mother Edu - Some College 
(Proxy 3) 
   
-0.18 
(0.48) 
Mother Edu - Bachelor's (Proxy 3)    
-0.13 
(0.43) 
Mother Edu - Grad. Degree (Proxy 
3) 
   
0.15 
(0.50) 
N 132 132 132 132 
R-Squared 0.04 0.05 0.07 --- 
Note: Numbers in parentheses below coefficient estimates are standard errors. ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 5%, and 1% p-value levels, respectively, in a two-sided alternative to 





Table 7: Average Ratings for Pay Systems 
Scenario 
MAT Students non-MAT Students 
Females Males All Females Males All 




























































































































































Note: Actual document presented to the participants was formatted to take up the front 
and back of only one page. 
Please complete this page first, then proceed to the back to complete the study. Upon 
completion you will be paid in cash for your participation as described below.  
For each of the 10 lottery pairs listed below, please indicate if you would prefer Option A or 
Option B by inserting a check mark in the  column. Please select only 1 option, either A or B, 
for each lottery. 
In each lottery pair you will be selecting between a lottery that will pay either $6.00 or $4.80 
(Option A) and a lottery that will pay either $11.55 or $0.30 (Option B). In the first lottery there 
is a 10% chance of receiving the larger payout for lottery 1 and a 90% chance of receiving the 
smaller amount. In each subsequent lottery pair the chance of earning the higher payout increases 
by 10%.    
After you complete this study the experimenter will roll a 10-sided die to randomly select which 
lottery will be used.  
Next, the experimenter will roll the same die a second time to determine your actual payoff 
based on the option you chose for that particular lottery.  
The number on the die for the second roll will determine whether you receive Payout 1 or Payout 
2.  
Example: If the experimenter's first roll is "3," then your payoff will based on Lottery 3. If you 
chose Option B for Lottery 3 and the second roll is "1", “2”, or “3”, you will receive a Payout of 
$11.55, but if the second roll is “4”, “5”, “6”, “7”, “8”, “9” or “10”, you will receive a Payout of 
$0.30.  
Please answer the following question which will not impact your payoff but is intended to ensure 
you understand this task. Suppose the experimenter rolls a "2" first and then rolls a “9”. If you 
have selected Option A for Lottery 2, what will your payout be? __________  







Lotteries. For each of the 10 lotteries listed below, please indicate if you would prefer Option A 
or Option B by inserting a check mark in the  column. Please select only 1 option per lottery. 
Lottery 
Option A Possible Roll(s) for 
Payout 
Option B 
 Payout Payout  
1.  
$6.00 1 $11.55 
 
$4.80 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
2.  
$6.00 1,2 $11.55 
 
$4.80 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
3.  
$6.00 1,2,3 $11.55 
 
$4.80 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
4.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4 $11.55 
 
$4.80 5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
5.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5 $11.55 
 
$4.80 6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
6.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6 $11.55 
 
$4.80 7,8,9,10 $0.30 
7.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 $11.55 
 
$4.80 8,9,10 $0.30 
8.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 $11.55 
 
$4.80 9,10 $0.30 
9.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 $11.55 
 
$4.80 10 $0.30 
10.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $11.55 
 






Pay Scenarios:  Below are descriptions of four different methods of providing pay increases to 
workers. Please read each description, then circle the number that indicates how desirable or 
undesirable you would find that pay increase method for your first job in your chosen occupation 
or career field. 
1. Pay for individual performance - In this system, you could get up to a 10 percent pay increase 
each year, depending on your individual job performance, as measured by objective factors. If 
your job performance was excellent, you would get a 10 percent increase; if very good, a 6 
percent increase; if minimally acceptable, a 3 percent increase; and if poor no increase. 
Highly 
Undesirable 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Highly 
Desirable 
2. Pay for developing your knowledge and skills - In this system, you could get up to a 10 
percent pay increase each year, depending on how well you develop a specified body of 
knowledge and skills, as judged by your supervisor and a group of more experienced peers. If 
you developed all of the specified skills to a high level, you would receive a 10 percent pay 
increase. If you developed all of the skills to a satisfactory level, you would receive a 6 percent 
increase. If you developed some but not all of the skills, you would receive a 3 percent increase. 
If you did not develop any of the skills, you would get no increase. 
Highly 
Undesirable 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Highly 
Desirable 
3. Pay for team performance - In this system, you would get up to a 10 percent pay increase each 
year depending on your team’s performance. Performance would be measured by objective 
factors. If your team’s performance was excellent, you would get a 10 percent increase; if very 
good, a 6 percent increase; if about average, a 3 percent increase; and if poor, no increase. 
Highly 
Undesirable 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Highly 
Desirable 
4. Pay not based on Performance - In this system, you and all other workers would get a 5 percent 
pay increase each year regardless of how well or poorly you or your team performed, or how 
well you developed your skills, as long as you performed well enough to keep your job.  
Highly 
Undesirable 









1. Year of Birth: _____________  2. Gender (circle please):  Male     Female   
 
3. Race/Ethnicity (circle please):  White     Black     Asian     Hispanic     Other (specify): 
____________ 
 
4. What graduate degree are you currently working towards? (circle please)  
   Ed.D.     M.A.T.   M.B.A     M.Ed.   Other (specify field and 
degree):_________________________ 
 
5. What is your mother's highest level of education? (circle please) 
   Less than H.S.   H. S.   Some College    Bachelor's Degree   Graduate Degree     
 
6. On average, how many times a week do you eat at a restaurant off campus? (circle please)   
   None     1-2     3-4     5-6     Daily     
 
7. What is the year, make, and model of your car? ___________________________________ 
 
8. What do you think the likelihood is that you go into teaching in a K-12 setting at some point in 
your life? (circle please)  
 
No Chance (0%)    Very Slim (1-25%)   Modest (26-75%)    Very Likely (76-99%)    Guaranteed 
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Does Merit Pay Attract Teachers with Different Risk Preferences? 
By: Daniel H. Bowen & Jonathan N. Mills 
Abstract 
Prior research suggests that teachers are more risk averse than individuals with 
comparable levels of education. Given the relatively high job security and step and lane salary 
schedules prevalent in the teaching profession, this finding may not be particularly surprising. 
There is reason to believe that a more ambiguous pay system, based more on student 
performance, would attract more relatively risk-loving individuals while also deterring risk-
averse teachers to the profession. This paper examines this hypothesis through the use of a risk-
elicitation tool common in experimental economics. We compare the risk preferences of teachers 
who choose to work at schools with performance-based pay to teachers at the same schools that 
were hired either before the implementation of this pay program or claimed that performance pay 
was not a deciding factor in their employment decisions.  
We find that teachers who actively choose schools with performance-pay programs are 
not significantly more risk loving; however, teachers who indicate that performance pay was a 
deciding factor in their employment decisions are significantly more risk loving. In addition to 
this relationship, we also find that number of years of teaching experience is a significant 
predictor of risk aversion. This finding is likely explained by the fact that individuals who remain 
in the same line of work for more extensive periods of time, regardless of profession, are 
probably less willing to take risks. While our finding does not indicate whether performance-
based pay improves overall teacher quality, this finding provides some affirmation for the 






Teacher quality is arguably the most important school input with regard to student 
achievement (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2004; Rockoff, 2004). 
The importance of teacher quality has led some education researchers to question how schools 
can attract the best and the brightest to come and work in the classroom (e.g. Ballou & 
Podgursky, 1995; Finn, 2001; Fox, 1984; Wallis, 2008). Teacher performance-based pay (i.e. 
merit pay) is one potential policy solution that continues to attract attention and gain public 
support (Howell, Peterson, & West, 2011; Meckler, 2009; Resmovits, 2011). While 
performance-based pay could incentivize current teachers to increase their efforts, it also has the 
potential to attract a new, better crop of teachers to the workforce (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  
Career choice, by nature, is almost an entirely endogenous decision. Individuals want 
careers that maximize their utilities, and employers structure jobs and compensation packages in 
hopes of attracting the best possible employees (given their finite resources). Labor economists 
have provided empirical research demonstrating that particular parameters of a job’s 
compensation packages can highly influence the matching of worker to employers (Salop & 
Salop, 1976). There is good reason to believe that teaching, as a profession, is not much different 
than other careers with regard to the importance of job and compensation structure as well as 
employee preferences and characteristics.  
Compensation for teachers has traditionally been through a step and lane pay scale that 
weights salary according to years of experience and the earning of additional credentials and 
certifications such as master’s degrees and a “Master Teacher Certification” (Podgursky, 2003; 
Sharpes, 1987). While an inherent advantage of this pay scale is that it can encourage those 




expense of failing to differentiate compensation according to a teacher’s effectiveness in the 
classroom (National Research Council Committee on Performance Appraisal for Merit Pay, 
1991). As a result, it is plausible that the structure of teacher compensation attracts individuals 
with a set of characteristics that differ from professions with different compensation packages. 
Advocates for performance-based pay argue that compensation based on students’ 
performances would better align teacher incentives with more desirable student outcomes (Dee 
& Keys, 2004; Podgursky & Springer, 2007). Moreover, some advocates also contend that 
changing pay formats will likely change the composition of the teacher workforce in hopes of 
this change bringing about improvements in the overall quality of the teacher labor pool 
(Woessman, 2011).  
The research on performance-based pay has almost entirely focused on whether changing 
pay structure facilitates increases in the effort levels of current teachers, typically measured in 
terms of student growth scores on standardized assessments. While improving the productivity 
levels of the current teacher labor force is an important and potentially valuable outcome of 
performance pay, this line of research does not comprehensively examine the total impact of a 
performance-based pay system. The other important aspect is whether changing the structure of 
teacher compensation can transform the composition of the teacher workforce. 
Beyond theoretical assumptions, little is known as to whether or not this compositional 
change would in fact take place within the teaching profession. An underlying issue with 
conducting such an evaluation is the fact that performance-based pay policies rarely exist long 
enough or are too small in scale to have a lasting impact on the workforce (e.g. the performance 




laboratory-type research can provide a more controlled setting for testing certain underlying 
hypotheses of a policy.   
  In a prior study Bowen, Buck, Deck, Mills, & Shuls (2013) find evidence that prospective 
teachers are indeed more risk averse than individuals with comparable levels of education and 
backgrounds. They argue that this finding suggests that the structure of the K-12 teaching 
profession attracts individuals with certain characteristics, specifically those with lower 
preferences for risk. Therefore, it is likely that changing certain aspects of the profession would 
change the composition of the teacher workforce. Bowen et al. (2013) also do not find 
conclusive evidence for whether choice of profession or risk preference predict the desire for one 
particular compensation format over another. They conclude that this finding could be the result 
of a lack of real-life experience with different salary types. They also suggest that this finding 
could be attributed to the relatively low risk that a performance-based pay program poses to an 
entry-level employee. 
In this study, we hope to further explore the relationship of how teacher quality reform 
policies might alter the composition of the teacher labor force. More specifically, we evaluate 
whether individuals drawn to teacher performance-based pay have different risk preferences than 
more traditional teachers. We use a risk-elicitation tool that is commonly used in experimental 
economics to directly measure teachers’ risk preferences. We examine whether or not teachers 
who are explicitly drawn to schools that offer performance-based pay have different risk 
preferences than other teachers at the same school. By focusing on teachers at the same school, 
we eliminate many factors that might influence characteristics that go beyond the explicit desire 
to be compensated through performance-based pay. We also survey participants on key 




and subject area to try and determine the relationship that these characteristics have with regard 
to teacher preferences.  
Literature Review 
The majority of the research on the effectiveness of performance pay, to this point, has 
not addressed the issue of whether performance pay programs can alter the composition of the 
labor force (Lazear, 2004; Sawchuck, 2010). Dohmen and Falk (2010) refer to this alternative 
aspect of performance pay as the sorting component: “Agents with different individual 
characteristics and personality feel attracted by different types of incentives. In this sense 
providing incentives in firms or organisations has two important effects, an incentive effect per 
se and a selection effect. Importantly, these effects need not be complementary” (p. F256). In 
other words, performance pay programs have the potential to incentivize the current workforce to 
be more productive. However, reforming the structure of compensation can also incentivize 
changes in outcomes that come about as a result of a significant shift in the characteristics for the 
types of individuals drawn to a particular profession. 
There substantial literature on the research that examines the effectiveness of 
performance pay as a motivator for the current teacher workforce (e.g. Dee & Keys, 2004; 
Springer et al., 2008; Springer et al., 2010). Based on the current body of evidence, performance 
pay tends to range from having statistically significant effects in both directions as well as no 
impact with regard to increasing students’ test scores (e.g. Figlio & Kenny, 2007; Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007; Sawchuck, 2010; Springer et al., 2008; Springer et al., 2010). There are several 
plausible explanations for why performance pay programs have not produced the desired results 
(e.g. unions co-opting reward design; rewards not large enough to induce significantly higher 




belief for the lack of substantial performance pay results. They find that teachers do not adapt 
their practices or increase efforts when a performance pay program is implemented. While this 
finding could be interpreted as meaning that teachers are stuck in their ways and unwilling to 
change how they teach, an alternative explanation is that teachers already maximize their efforts; 
therefore, it is difficult for them to increase their efforts due to ceiling effect (Gratz, 2009). If 
performance-based pay programs are found to be unsuccessful when it comes to increasing 
student achievement, then the success of performance pay programs would entirely depend on 
whether they can significantly change the composition of the teacher workforce.  
Different types of pay or incentive schemes will attract potential employees according to 
characteristics and skills (Salop & Salop, 1976). Oyer and Schaefer (2005) provide the example 
of a private sector firm offering lower-level employees stock options. New businesses will often 
choose to compensate employees with stock options because they tend to lack the resources 
necessary for offering higher wages. While cost convenient for a new firm, such a policy can 
also induce a selection process that screens on characteristics that a particular business finds 
desirable. Employees that select jobs where employers provide stock options over a more fixed 
salary are more likely to feel optimistic about the prospects of the business, develop a sense that 
they have more “skin in the game,” and demonstrate less risk-averse tendencies. Assuming that 
an employer desires these traits, providing an alternative form of compensation provides a 
desirable sorting mechanism. Lazear (2000) offers empirical evidence supporting personnel 
economics theory with data from an auto glass company. He finds that, after a shift to a piece-
rate compensation system, workers become significantly more productive and that, over time, 




Public sector jobs often come with tenure or civil service protections that are more 
protective than the private sector. Economists often find that these public sector workers tend to 
be more risk averse than those in the private sector (Dohmen et al., 2005; Hartog, Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, & Jonker, 2002; Masclet, Colombier, Denant-Boemont, & Loheac, 2009). Using 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, Bellante and Link (1981) conduct surveys and 
find that risk aversion was a significant predictor of employment in the public sector. Buurman, 
Delfgaauw, Dur, and Van den Bossche (2012) analyze the survey data of more than 3,000 
employees in the Netherlands; employees were offered a reward for completing the survey and 
offered a choice between a gift certificate, a national lottery ticket, or donating the money to 
charity. After controlling for some key demographics, they find that public sector workers’ odds 
of choosing the lottery ticket were 0.68 times the odds of a private sector worker.  
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010) provide suggestive evidence regarding 
teacher risk attitudes. In one experiment, they asked subjects to complete as many multiplication 
problems as they could in a 10-minute period. After this task, subjects were asked to choose 
either a fixed compensation or a payment that varied with individual success at getting a 
subsequent round of multiplication problems correct. Dohmen et al. find that higher-performing 
subjects are more likely to choose a variable compensation method. They also find that, even 
controlling for performance on the task, women were 20% less likely to choose the variable pay 
scheme. This finding suggests that women tend to not prefer competition or greater uncertainty 
when it comes to compensation. This finding is potentially relevant to teaching, which is 
primarily composed of females. 
Perez (2011) conducts an experiment, examining risk preferences, attitudes towards pay 




change the composition of the teacher labor force. In the study, she compares female candidates 
in the Stanford Teaching Education Program with female law students. Participants completed a 
series of 10-minute rounds of solving mazes and made decisions with regard to compensation for 
subsequent rounds of puzzle solving. Noting that similar numbers of prospective teachers and 
lawyers chose a tournament pay scheme, Perez concludes “teachers do not exhibit a higher level 
of risk aversion [or] a dislike for competition that is higher than female lawyers” (p. 18-19). 
However, teachers were significantly more likely to be averse to pay inequity, meaning they 
tended to like differences in pay between individuals less than women in law school. Perez 
claims that this finding could show that teachers have fundamental inclinations towards greater 
pay equity and that policymakers should take this inclination into consideration. 
Finally, Bowen et al. (2013) conduct an experiment comparing the risk preferences of 
teacher candidates to law school students and students pursuing a Masters of Business 
Administration. They find that these teacher candidates are significantly more risk averse than 
the comparison group. The authors argue that this finding is likely due to a sorting effect that 
could be attributed to the general structure of the teaching profession. Bowen et al. conclude that 
policymakers should take this finding into account when designing education policies that may 
be at odds with the characteristics and preferences of the general teacher workforce, especially 
when these policies aim to influence the behaviors of the current workforce. 
Methods 
Risk Task 
To directly measure the risk attitudes of those teachers explicitly choosing performance-
based pay as opposed to other teachers in the same schools, we use a procedure developed by 




experimental economics literature (e.g. Anderson, Harrison, Lau, & Rutstrom, 2008; Dohmen et 
al., 2010; Eckel & Wilson, 2004). While several experimental risk-elicitation tools are available 
(e.g. Eckel & Grossman, 2002), this procedure has become a generally accepted standard. This 
status is due in part to the ease with which it can be implemented and explained to study 
participants. Harrison, Johnson, McInnes, and Rutstrom (2005) have found this procedure to 
have good retest reliability over time. Anderson and Mellor (2008) have also found that higher 
levels of risk aversion on the Holt and Laury task are negatively and significantly related to 
failure to use a seatbelt, cigarette smoking, being overweight or obese, and heavy drinking. 
 The task presented in Table 1 is our version of the Holt and Laury (2002) task that was 
provided to the participants of this study. Participants were asked to choose between options A 
and B for 10 different lotteries. There are two possible payouts for each option, and these 
payouts are fixed across all lotteries. The payouts for Option A are $4.80 or $6.00, and the 
payouts for Option B are $0.30 or $11.55. We refer to Option A as the “safe” choice because it 
has less disparity in the potential payouts than Option B. As the participant progresses from one 
lottery to the next the likelihood of receiving the higher of the two payouts for both options 
increases by 10 percentage points. Since the likelihood of receiving the higher payout 
consistently increases as one progresses through the different lotteries, a consistent individual 
will choose Option A for the first i lotteries and then after making the switch to Option B will 
stick with this option for the remaining lotteries. Participants were instructed that their payout 
would ultimately be determined by their choice for one of the lotteries and that this lottery would 
be determined by the roll of a ten-sided die. 
 The expected payout is determined by multiplying the two possible payouts within an 




individual always chooses the option with the higher expected payout. Option A has a higher 
expected payout for the first four lotteries; Option B has a higher expected payout for the 
remaining six lotteries. The switching point from Option A to Option B identifies a range of risk 
parameters that are consistent with the observed choice (see Holt & Laury, 2002). Risk-loving 
individuals will choose Option B before the fifth lottery because the possibility of receiving the 
high payout is valued more than the difference between the expected payouts of Options A and 
B. Risk-averse individuals will not switch to Option B before the sixth lottery because their value 
of reducing uncertainty is greater than the differences in the expected payouts. An extremely 
risk-averse individual may choose to disproportionately stick with Option A to ensure at least a 
$4.80 payout, but all participants should choose Option B for lottery 10 because at this point the 
higher payout is guaranteed.   
The Holt and Laury (2002) procedure not only provides rich information on individual 
preferences, it also allows us to check the extent to which subject confusion exists in our data: 
rational individuals should never select Option A on Lottery X after having selected Option B for 
Lottery Y if X>Y. Multiple switches could serve as one indicator of participant confusion. 
Rational individuals should also choose Option B for the tenth lottery because of the guaranteed 
higher payout. Therefore, multiple switches and choosing Option A for the tenth lottery serve as 




                                                     
6
 It is worth noting that there is anecdotal evidence that some participants may have made 
seemingly irrational choices that are not the result of confusion. For example, one subject 
seemed to fully comprehend the Holt and Laury procedure but still made multiple switches. 
Participants were never asked to explain their choices, but this participant stated that the decision 
to switch over to Option B for two of the lotteries before switching back to Option A was 




Risk Elicitation Procedures 
 
A total of 120 teachers participated in this study. All participants were employed at two 
different school districts which have implemented a performance-based pay program. One 
district is a charter school that had a performance-based pay program in place between the 2008-
09 and 2011-12 school years.
7
 The other district is a traditional public school district that 
implemented performance pay in 2009-10 and still has the program in place as of the 2012-13 
school year. Of the 120 participants, 48 (40%) are designated as having opted in to a 
performance-based pay system. These 48 participants decided to work in a school with a 
performance pay program in place. Of these 48 participants, 13 (27%) indicated that 




To conduct the study, we first obtained permission from the school administrators to offer 
their teachers the opportunity to participate in a paid research study that examines how 
individuals make economic decisions. Teachers had the opportunity to participate during their 
planning periods, lunch breaks, or at the end of the day. Teachers were notified about the 
opportunity to participate in this study either the day before or the morning of the study.  
When the teachers arrived, the researcher greeted the participant, briefly described the 
study as being about how different people make economic decisions, and then provided a 
handout of the participation consent form. Teachers were made aware that they were free to 
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 This school stopped performance-based pay because of lack of funding, not because of an 
administrative or faculty decision. 
8
 Two participants that did not opt in to the performance pay systems also indicated that this 
policy was a deciding factor. While these teachers may have chosen to stay at their current 
schools, rather than seek employment elsewhere because of this policy, we do not include them 




leave at any point since participation was completely optional and voluntary.
9
 If they agreed to 
still partake, participants were then given a single, two-sided sheet of paper with instructions. On 
the front side was a sample question to verify that the subject understood the Holt and Laury task 
in addition to the actual risk-elicitation instrument. Survey questions were located on the back 
side of the paper (see Appendix).  
Participants were asked to read the directions, complete the comprehension question, and 
then notify the researcher upon completion in order to verify that the participant understood how 
the elicitation procedure worked before the rest of the survey was completed. If the subject 
completed the sample question correctly, the monitor marked the form in a particular location on 
the paper. If the subject got the sample question incorrect or requested further explanation, then 
the monitor marked the survey form in a different location to indicate a lack of initial 
comprehension. Marking the surveys in this way allowed us to discreetly track which subjects 
experienced at least some initial confusion about the procedure.  
After the monitor verified that the participant understood the instructions, the participant 
was then asked to complete the risk-elicitation task before proceeding to the other side of the 
paper to complete a brief survey. Participants were aware the survey existed before completing 
the risk-elicitation task, but they did not know its contents. The survey was completed after the 
risk-elicitation task in order to prevent the possibility that these questions could frame or 
influence subjects’ behaviors while indicating their lottery preferences. Researchers verified that 
participants completed the entire form and tried to ensure that subjects did not talk or otherwise 
communicate with each other while completing the study.  
                                                     
9





The survey included background information to control for and examine other potentially 
salient characteristics. On top of age, gender,
 
income level, undergraduate institution, work 
history, and mother’s level of education, we also asked participants about their number of years 
of teaching experience, the year they were hired to work at the school, and their opinions and 
preferences with regard to performance pay.  
Upon completion of the study, participants notified the researcher. The researchers first 
verified that subjects completed all questions, and then rolled a ten-sided die to determine which 
lottery choice would be used for determining the participant’s payment.
10
 Then, the ten-sided die 
was rolled again to determine the actual payment according to the subject’s choice of Option A 
or B for the randomly chosen lottery. Participants then signed a participant payment form to 
verify their payout amounts and were thanked for their participation in the study. On average, 
participants earned $6.29 for about fifteen minutes of their time. 
Sample 
Before examining teacher behavior, we first examine the descriptive statistics of our 
sample. Our sample consists of 120 teachers, 50 from a charter school and 70 from a traditional 
public school district. These two school campuses consisted of different school buildings for 
different school grade levels. Of the teachers in our sample, 43% taught at an elementary school, 
23% at a middle school, and 34% at a high school. The average participant was 40 years old and 
had 11 years of teaching experience. The overwhelming majority of the participants were female 
(80%) and white (93%). The majority (68%) of the teachers were instructing in core subject 
areas (i.e. mathematics, science, language arts, and/or social studies). The other teachers either 
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were strictly involved in special education (9%) or taught in a non-core subject area (e.g. 
physical education, art, foreign language, etc.) (24%). 
We also examine descriptive statistics for our groups of interest: teachers who were 
employed with the performance pay program in place and teachers who indicated that 
performance-based pay was a deciding factor in their employment decision. There are some 
significant differences in these groups worth noting. Teachers who opted in as well as those who 
indicated performance pay as a deciding factor were significantly younger and less experienced. 
These teachers were also much more likely to live in households that were making less than 
$50,000 a year and have mothers who had earned at least an undergraduate degree. Finally, these 
teachers were much more likely to be employed in the charter school district.  
These differences are worth noting but are not all that surprising. Teachers employed 
during the relatively recent implementation of the performance pay program are almost certainly 
going to be younger and less experienced and therefore have lower household incomes. There 
are no significant differences in gender, race, subject area, and grade level. See Table 2 for the 
sample descriptive statistics. 
Results 
 
 The primary research question for this study is whether teachers who are drawn to 
performance-based pay systems differ in their risk preferences from other teachers. Our data 
allow us to answer this question in two different ways: examining individuals who opted in to the 
performance pay program and examining individuals who indicated that performance-based pay 
was a deciding factor in their employment decision. The results include all the participants from 
our study; we do not exclude participants who showed initial comprehension issues or 




with these participants excluded from our data set. Point estimates differ between these sets of 
analyses; however, the estimate signs and significances generally remain unchanged.
11
 
First, we focus on individuals who indicated that they opted in to the performance pay 
program. In our sample, 48 (40%) of the participants made this selection.
12
 In order to test for 
differences in risk aversion, we use the number of safe choices (Option A) as the measure of a 
participant’s level of risk preference. Looking strictly at averages, participants who chose to 
work in a school with performance-based pay were essentially no different than the other 
teachers. In fact, teachers that opted in to the performance pay program made 0.11 more safe 
choices than those that did not select into the program. Results from a t-test for differences in 
means fails to reject the hypothesis that the two groups are similar on average (p-value = 0.81).  
We also compare the two groups by looking at the full distributions of their choices. 
Figure 1 presents a comparison of the distribution of safe choices between participants who opt 
in to performance pay programs and those who do not. The dotted line in Figure 1 represents the 
choice distribution for a perfectly risk neutral group. The further the line remains above the 
dotted line after the 5
th
 lottery, the more risk averse the group. Figure 1 clearly indicates that 
teachers who opted into the performance pay program are not significantly different than those 
teachers who did not opt in to this pay program. Indeed, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 
distributional differences (p-value = 0.77) as well as a Mann-Whitney test of rank-sum 
differences (p-value = 0.98) both fail to reject the hypothesis of no significant differences.
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 The coefficients on opting in and performance pay being a determining factor generally get 
larger when removing these 24 participants (20% of the total sample). However, significances 
still generally remain unchanged. The exceptions are with the fourth through seventh 
specifications. When removing participants deemed inconsistent, the significances on 
determining factor go from being significant at 99% confidence level to significant at the 95% 
confidence level (p-values = 0.05, 0.03, 0.02, and 0.03, respectively).  
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 Next, we test for whether there are differences for participants who indicate that 
performance-based pay was a deciding factor in their employment decisions. It could be the case 
that teachers identified as having “opted in” to schools with these programs were not actively 
seeking a school that offered performance pay. Figure 2 provides a comparison of the 
distribution of safe choices for these two groups of teachers. Interestingly, the distribution for 
teachers who considered performance pay to be a deciding factor tends to be lower relative to 
other teachers, a finding that would indicate that these teachers are more risk preferring on 
average. Indeed, the 13 participants who indicated that performance pay was a deciding factor in 
their decision to work at their school made 1.33 fewer safe choices on average.  
The difference in these averages is significant at the 90 percent confidence level (p-value 
= 0.06). A Mann-Whitney rank-sum test of differences also rejects the hypothesis of no 
significant differences between groups at the 95 percent confidence level (p-value = 0.03). 
Despite evidence of significantly different means and visual evidence indicating that these 
teachers are more risk averse than other teachers, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that 
the two groups of teachers do not share the same distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-value = 
0.48). However, these results may be driven by having such a small number of teachers 
indicating that the performance pay program was a deciding factor, making these results still 
inconclusive. 
 The analyses presented so far have focused on differences in groups without controlling 
for additional demographic factors. Table 3 presents the results of 7 ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions that account for such differences. Column (1) indicates that teachers who opt in are 
no different than those who do not; however those who have opted in and indicate that merit pay 




The model specification for column (2) analyzes how other factors associated with risk 
preferences (gender, age, race, experience, and school district) are associated with the number of 
safe choices. The sign for gender and experience coincide with intuition and prior research: 
females are more likely to choose more safe options and individuals with more teaching 
experience are more likely to choose the safer option. Interestingly, gender is not statistically 
significant in any of the specifications in Table 3. The sign for age is also somewhat surprising: 
older individuals choose slightly fewer safe options on average. This is explained by the fact that 
this specification additionally controls for experience, so teachers who enter the profession at 
older ages are slightly more risk preferring than teachers who entered the profession at a younger 
age. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient is not statistically distinguishable from zero. 
The third specification examines how these demographics are associated with risk 
preferences after accounting for individual opt-in status. The only variables that are significantly 
associated with the number of safe choices one makes are the deciding factor variable and 
experience. Column (4) includes controls for mother’s education and a postsecondary quality 
measure; column (5) controls for current household income, and the sixth specification includes 
controls for the teacher’s subject area, grade level, and whether they have always been a teacher 
as opposed to transferring from another, non-education profession. None of these additional 
variables are significantly related to risk preferences. The only variables consistently related to 
the number of safe choices are whether the performance pay program was a deciding factor and 
years of experience. 
In our final specification, we examine how these variables are related to risk preferences 
while accounting for all of these characteristics. Again, we find that only the indication that 




significantly related to the number of safe choices one makes. In particular, teachers who 
indicate that performance pay was a deciding factor make significantly fewer safe choices than 
other teachers who opted in to the program, and more experienced teachers make significantly 
more safe choices than other teachers.  
 Thus far, we have found that teachers who opt into a performance pay program are not 
necessarily less risk averse than other teachers; however, those who considered the performance 
pay program to be a deciding factor are somewhat more risk preferring. We have additionally 
found evidence that, controlling for more experience is associated with making more safe 
choices. In particular, we find that for each additional 10 years of teaching experience, 
participants make 0.7 more safe choices. This result is intuitive since individuals that stick with 
their jobs for longer periods, regardless of the occupation, are likely more risk averse.  
Discussion & Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate if there are differences in risk preferences between teachers 
who opt into performance pay programs and those who do not. Given the relatively risky nature 
of a performance-based pay program compared to the traditional salary schedule, we expected to 
find teachers who voluntarily opted into such programs to be more risk preferring than those who 
did not. Surprisingly, our data do not support this conclusion: teachers who opted into the 
performance pay programs were not significantly more risk preferring than other teachers. 
On the other hand, we do find evidence that teachers who indicate that the performance 
pay program was a deciding factor in their decision to work at the school are significantly more 
risk preferring than other teachers. It could be argued that these performance-preferring teachers 
are indeed those that would be drawn to a long-term performance pay program as opposed to the 




these teachers represent a relatively small subset of our entire sample (11%), so we believe this 
finding requires further exploration in order to be more conclusive. 
Our other finding, that experience is positively related to risk aversion, is probably not 
that surprising. Intuitively, individuals who are more likely to remain with the same job for a 
longer period are going to be more risk averse. The fact that experience is a predictor of risk 
aversion that is independent of age makes it difficult to determine whether teacher risk aversion 
is something that is developed as a result of socialization. Based on the results from Bowen et al. 
(2013), we do not believe that socialization explains teachers’ risk aversion. It is likely that job 
experience, regardless of profession, is positively associated with risk aversion.  
While the size and nature of this study raise concerns with regard to external validity 
issues, our findings provide some insights into the issue of whether to expect compositional 
workforce changes as a result of implementing a performance-based pay program in the short 
term. It appears that some teachers have strong preferences for performance pay programs, and 
we further find evidence that these teachers may be more risk loving than other teachers. 
However, even though this study attempts to examine a causal relationship by taking advantage 
of the relatively exogenous implementation of the performance pay program, it is difficult to 
determine the accuracy of participants’ claims that the program was a “deciding factor”. In other 
words, performance pay may have been much more of a deciding factor for some of these 
participants than was indicated. If a teacher was initially excited about the prospect of 
performance pay and then had a bad experience, hindsight bias might influence how they answer 
that survey question. The same could be true for participants who indicated that performance pay 
was a deciding factor. These participants may not have been seeking performance pay, but 




These results provide some preliminary insights into how changing teacher compensation 
structures can impact the composition of the teaching workforce. However, these findings do not 
speak to the differences in the quality between teachers who select into performance pay 
programs and those who do not as well as whether risk aversion predicts teacher effectiveness. 
This question is especially important because finding that performance pay alters the 
composition of the teacher workforce only tells half of the story. The other important question 
with regard to the shift in the composition of the labor pool is whether performance pay can 
attract higher quality teachers without producing a net loss in the quality of teachers currently 
drawn to the profession. This study supports the argument that performance-based pay would 
likely attract a fundamentally different group of individuals to the profession; in a subsequent 
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Table 1: Lottery Choices  
 
Lottery 
Option A Possible Roll(s) for 
Payout 
Option B 
 Payout Payout  
1.  
$6.00 1 $11.55 
 
$4.80 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
2.  
$6.00 1,2 $11.55 
 
$4.80 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
3.  
$6.00 1,2,3 $11.55 
 
$4.80 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
4.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4 $11.55 
 
$4.80 5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
5.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5 $11.55 
 
$4.80 6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
6.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6 $11.55 
 
$4.80 7,8,9,10 $0.30 
7.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 $11.55 
 
$4.80 8,9,10 $0.30 
8.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 $11.55 
 
$4.80 9,10 $0.30 
9.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 $11.55 
 
$4.80 10 $0.30 
10.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $11.55 
 





Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Overall Mean Opted In 
Opted In + 
Deciding Factor 
N 120 48 13 
Age 40.2 35.2 32.9 
Experience 11.0 8.0 6.9 
Female 80.0% 81.2% 84.6% 
White 92.5% 91.7% 92.3% 
Postsec. Avg. ACT 22.7 22.8 22.9 
Mother’s Education    
Less Than HS 5.8% 2.1% --- 
HS Degree 29.2% 16.7% 7.7% 
Some College 23.3% 22.9% --- 
Undergraduate Degree 26.7% 41.7% 61.5% 
Graduate Degree 15.0% 16.7% 30.8% 
Household Income    
Less Than $50k 30.0% 37.5% 53.8% 
$51k-$80k 27.5% 31.3% 23.1% 
$81k-$110k 28.3% 22.9% 23.1% 
More Than $110k 12.5% 8.3% --- 
Teaching Subject Area*    
General Education 14.5% 19.1% 23.1% 
Core Subject 68.3% 76.6% 84.6% 
Math/Science 32.5% 31.9% 30.8% 
Humanities 23.1% 27.7% 38.5% 
Special Education 8.5% 8.5% 7.7% 
Other 12.7% 8.4% 7.7% 
School    
Charter 41.7% 72.9% 92.3% 
Traditional Public 58.3% 27.1% 7.7% 
Teaching Level    
Elementary 42.5% 50.0% 61.5% 
Middle 23.3% 25.0% 30.8% 





Table 3: Regression Results for Number of Safe Choices 


































































































       
College 
Quality 
   X   X 
Mother’s 
Education 
   X   X 
Household 
Income 
    X  X 
Teacher 
Subject Area 
     X X 
School Grade 
Level 
     X X 
















        
N 119 119 119 111 119 112 105 
R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.12 
Note: Numbers in parentheses below coefficient estimates are standard errors. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% p-value levels, respectively, in a two-sided 






Note: Actual document was formatted to take up the front and back of only one page. 
Please complete this page first, then proceed to the back to complete the study.  Upon 
completion you will be paid in cash for your participation as described below.  
For each of the 10 lottery pairs listed below, please indicate if you would prefer Option A or 
Option B by inserting a check mark in the  column. Please select only 1 option, either A or 
B, for each lottery. 
In each lottery pair you will be selecting between a lottery that will pay either $6.00 or $4.80 
(Option A) and a lottery that will pay either $11.55 or $0.30 (Option B).  In the first lottery 
there is a 10% chance of receiving the larger payout for lottery 1 and a 90% chance of 
receiving the smaller amount. In each subsequent lottery pair the chance of earning the 
higher payout increases by 10%.     
After you complete this study, the experimenter will roll a 10-sided die to randomly select 
which lottery will be used.  
Next, the experimenter will roll the same die a second time to determine your actual payoff 
based on the option you chose for that particular lottery.  
The number on the die for the second roll will determine whether you receive Payout 1 or 
Payout 2.  
Example: If the experimenter's first roll is "3," then your payoff will based on Lottery 3.  If 
you chose Option B for Lottery 3 and the second roll is "1", “2”, or “3”, you will receive a 
Payout of $11.55, but if the second roll is “4”, “5”, “6”, “7”, “8”, “9” or “10”, you will 
receive a Payout of $0.30.   
Please answer the following question which will not impact your payoff but is intended to 
ensure you understand this task. Suppose the experimenter rolls a "2" first and then rolls a 
“9”.  If you have selected Option A for Lottery 2, what will your payout be? __________  
Please notify the experimenter when you have answered this question before you continue 






Lotteries.  For each of the 10 lotteries listed below, please indicate if you would prefer Option A 
or Option B by inserting a check mark in the  column. Please select only 1 option per lottery. 
 
Lottery 
Option A Possible Roll(s) for 
Payout 
Option B 
 Payout Payout  
1.  
$6.00 1 $11.55 
 
$4.80 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
2.  
$6.00 1,2 $11.55 
 
$4.80 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
3.  
$6.00 1,2,3 $11.55 
 
$4.80 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
4.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4 $11.55 
 
$4.80 5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
5.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5 $11.55 
 
$4.80 6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
6.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6 $11.55 
 
$4.80 7,8,9,10 $0.30 
7.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 $11.55 
 
$4.80 8,9,10 $0.30 
8.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 $11.55 
 
$4.80 9,10 $0.30 
9.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 $11.55 
 
$4.80 10 $0.30 
10.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $11.55 
 








1. Year of Birth: _____________   
 
2. Gender (please circle):      Female         Male   
 
3. Race/Ethnicity (please circle):  White       Black       Asian       Hispanic        
 
        Other (please specify): ______________________________ 
 
4. Undergraduate Degree (please specify field and degree):_____________________________ 
 
5. Undergraduate Institution:______________________________________________________ 
 
6. What is your mother's highest level of education? (please circle) 
 
    Less than H.S.        H. S.        Some College        Bachelor's Degree        Graduate Degree     
 
7. What is your estimated annual household income? (please circle) 
 
Less than $35k        $36K-$50k        $51k-65k        $66k-80k        $81k-$95k        $96k-$110k    
 
$111k-$125k        Greater than $125k 
 
8. How many years total have you taught prior to this school year? __________ 
 
9. What is your primary teaching subject? ____________________________________________ 
 
10. Did you participate in this school’s performance pay program? (please circle)     Yes         No 
 
11. If you participated in the performance pay program, were you employed at this school before 
it began? (please circle)   Yes       No           
 
For #12-15, please indicate how you feel about the following statements: (please circle) 
 
12. The performance pay program was the deciding factor for me working at this school.  
     
   Strongly Disagree            Disagree          Neutral          Agree       Strongly Agree               N/A 
 
13. If I were looking to work in a different school, I would want to teach in a school that offered 
teacher performance pay.   
     






14. I believe that teachers should be paid based on student performance. 
    
      Strongly Disagree               Disagree               Neutral               Agree               Strongly Agree 
 
15. I plan to spend the rest of my career as a teacher. 
     
     Strongly Disagree               Disagree               Neutral               Agree               Strongly Agree 
 
On the scales below, please indicate how you, as a teacher, would prefer to be compensated.  
 
 16.                                
 
100% Student Performance                                     50/50                       100% Teacher Experience 
 
17.                                                   
 
100% Just My Performance                                     50/50                        100% Team Performance 
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Do Risk and Pay Preferences Predict Teacher Effectiveness? 




School districts and charter schools implement performance-based pay programs with 
one of their goals being to attract and reward higher quality teachers. Prospective teachers who 
want to be compensated based more on their students’ performances will likely envision 
themselves as being more effective in the classroom. However, there are aspects of performance 
pay that might deter individuals who are (or would be) effective teachers from remaining in (or 
entering) the profession. For example, introducing pay ambiguity and emphasizing student test 
performance could bring about unacceptable levels of stress for those currently interested in the 
teaching profession.  
In this paper I attempt to provide some preliminary evidence for how implementing a 
transfer to performance-based pay might influence teacher quality. I examine the relationships 
between two teacher quality measures and individuals’ preferences for performance-based pay as 
well as their risk preferences. Based on the evidence from this study, there appears to be a strong, 
negative relationship between the extent to which a teacher prefers pay based on performance to 
their value-added scores (p = 0.09). While there is also a strong, positive relationship between 
the extent to which a teacher is risk averse and value-added scores, this relationship fails to reach 
traditional levels of statistical significance. There are no significant associations between 
teachers’ pay or risk preferences and their year-end performance evaluations. These findings 
suggest that the attraction of performance pay-preferring and risk-loving individuals will not 




should concern policymakers looking to implement performance pay policies because this 
reform could potentially deter anti-merit pay and more risk-averse, though effective, teachers 
from entering or remaining in the profession. 
Introduction 
The importance of teacher quality is reflected both in the education research literature as 
well as the amount of attention it receives in the media as well as policy circles (e.g. Chetty, 
Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011; Darling-Hammond, 1999; Green, 2010; Kristof, 2012; Rice, 2003). 
Despite the emphasis on teacher quality, what makes for or how to attract better teachers 
remains, to a great extent, unknown (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2010; Kane, Rockoff, & Staiger, 2008; 
Rockoff, Jacob, Kane, & Staiger, 2011). Education policymakers develop and implement 
policies in hopes of attracting and retaining individuals who will improve student outcomes (e.g. 
Auguste, Kihn, & Miller, 2010; Finn, 2001). One of the increasingly popular policies, that is at 
least partly aimed at improving teacher quality, is performance-based (i.e. merit) pay for teachers 
(Ballou & Podgursky, 1995; Fox, 1984; Goldhaber, DeArmond, Player, & Choi, 2008). 
However, while one of the main goals of performance-based pay is to attract higher-quality 
individuals to the profession, introducing more ambiguity to the compensation format could have 
the unintended consequence of deterring individuals who prefer to avoid risk, yet would prove 
effective in the classroom. 
Prior studies suggest that individuals who choose to go into K-12 teaching are more risk 
averse than other professionals with comparable educational backgrounds (e.g. Bowen, Buck, 
Deck, Mills, & Shuls, 2013; Davis, 1994). There is also evidence that teachers who choose to 
work at schools that offer performance-based pay are more risk loving (Bowen & Mills, 2013). 




structure of teacher compensation to a more performance-based format could alter the 
composition of the workforce. However, the conclusions of these studies do not address the issue 
of whether such a change improves the overall quality of the workforce in terms of student 
achievement. 
In this paper I hope to provide some preliminary evidence for how the introduction of 
performance pay might influence the quality of the teacher workforce. Using an instrument 
common to experimental economics as well as survey responses, I analyze 120 teachers’ risk 
preferences and desires for performance pay and attempt to determine how these preferences 
relate to their effectiveness as educators. Examining individuals’ desire for performance pay as 
well as risk preferences and relating them to measures of effectiveness should provide a glimpse 
into whether this reform will likely appeal to individuals with characteristics that relate to better 
teaching. Additionally, these analyses provide means for investigating the effectiveness of 
teachers whom are the least likely to support this type of reform and could be the most likely to 
leave a school or district in response to the implementation of such a policy.   
Intuitively, the relationship between risk aversion and both measures of teacher quality 
could go in either direction. Teachers who prefer taking risks might be more willing to 
incorporate new instructional methods that increase students’ achievement scores. Conversely, 
risk taking might not always benefit students and could even prove detrimental. Risk takers 
might also be prone to making rash decisions that have negative consequences with regard to 
student learning. The same might be true for year-end principal ratings. A reform-oriented 
principal might prefer a teacher who is more willing to take risks and is willing to adapt to new 
teaching styles and curricula. However, less reform-oriented principals may favor teachers who 




The connection between the stated the desire for basing compensation on performance 
and measures of teacher quality should be less ambiguous. Teachers who would rather work 
under performance-based compensation should also be more likely to financially benefit from 
this compensation format. Teachers should prefer merit pay when they view themselves as being 
highly effective, both in terms of students’ test score gains and principal evaluations. However, 
the evaluation systems that come with performance-based pay might not be well-received with 
teachers with a mission focus or greater intrinsic motivation. Moreover, performance-based pay 
might simply stress out highly effective teachers who already maximize their teaching efforts.  
I find that there are substantive, negative relationships between teachers’ value-added 
scores and both the extent to which they prefer pay for performance as well as propensity for 
risk. A standard deviation increase on a preference for performance-based pay compensation 
scale is associated with a 0.20 standard deviation decrease in average student value-added score 
(p-value = 0.09). The decision to make one additional safe choice on the Holt and Laury (2002) 
risk-elicitation task relates to a 0.06 standard deviation increase in average student value-added 
score; however, this effect fails to achieve a traditional level of statistical significance (p-value = 
0.15). Performance pay and risk preferences have no significant relationship to a teacher’s year-
end principal rating. The extent to which a teacher would prefer to have pay based on individual 
versus team performance also has no significant relationship to either teacher quality measure. 
These findings suggest that if policies such as performance pay were to attract individuals 
more supportive of basing pay on student performance as well as more risk-loving individuals, 
then this compositional shift would not bring about higher student achievement. Moreover, such 
a policy could potentially deter effective teachers from entering or remaining in the profession. 




relationship between teachers’ preferences and effectiveness, they do provide an early insight 
into whether performance pay would in fact have the desired outcome of attracting individuals 
who would prove to be more effective than the current workforce. 
In the next section I provide a review of the literature focusing on the relationships 
between risk preferences and other characteristics related to teacher effectiveness in addition to 
relevant studies on the personalities of individuals who choose to become K-12 teachers. Then, I 
discuss the survey instrument and procedures. After that, I describe the sample used for this 
study. In the final sections, I present findings, discuss results, and conclude with potential policy 
implications as well as proposals for future studies that would help to further examine this issue. 
Literature Review 
 Prior studies have concluded that K-12 teachers are generally more risk averse than 
professionals with similar educational backgrounds (Bowen et al., 2013; Davis, 1994; Wagner, 
2001). While not conclusive, Bowen and Mills (2013) administer the Holt and Laury (2002) risk-
elicitation task as well as a survey and find evidence that individuals who actively seek and opt-
in to schools that offer performance-based pay are not as risk averse as their colleagues. 
Together, these studies provide an argument for the potential of performance pay policies to 
significantly change the composition of the teacher workforce, at least with regard to risk 
preferences.  
 There is a shared belief that the risk averseness of teachers is a source of concern when it 
comes to the quality of the workforce. Hannaway (2009), explains how performance pay can 
attract more effective teachers to the classroom; “If you reward performance, applicants who are 
confident in what they can do and are less risk-averse may be more attracted to the profession 




sentiment is common among performance pay advocates; “The major benefit of merit pay, 
according to proponents, is that it could attract a ‘different type’ of candidate to the profession, 
one who is less risk-averse and more drawn to a job that rewards them according to results.”  
One reason for the desire to attract less risk-averse individuals to the profession is that 
this transition will lead to a broader base of people wanting to enter the profession. If certain 
aspects of the profession, unrelated to effectiveness in the classroom, are limiting who ultimately 
enters the profession, then changing or eliminating these components should increase the labor 
supply which should in turn boost the overall number of high quality teachers (Lavy, 2007). 
According to a study by Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman, and Meijers (2009), less risk-averse 
individuals tend to be more ambitious and less neurotic, characteristics that could translate into 
greater teacher quality. However, when making changes to a particular aspect of the profession, 
it is important to make sure that these changes do not result in overall decreases in the quality of 
the composition of the workforce by dissuading more effective individuals currently drawn to the 
field than would be ultimately attracted (Oyer & Schaefer, 2008). 
Another reason teacher risk preferences matter is attributed to findings that individuals’ 
personalities are tied to the instructional styles that they adopt which could affect student 
learning. Fairhurst and Fairhurst (1995) find that Myers-Briggs personality profiles significantly 
predict teachers’ preferred learning environments. For example, they find that introverts prefer 
quieter, controlled classroom settings. Studies have also shown that teachers’ risk preferences 
significantly influence their instructional approaches. Individuals who are less risk averse are 
more likely to be innovative and open to trying new things (Chen, Greene, & Crick, 1998). Hills, 
Stroup, and Wilensky (2005) conclude that more risk-loving teachers are more likely to engage 




are more conducive to student learning (Calik, Ayas, Coll, Unal, & Costu, 2007; Keys & Bryan, 
2001; Liang & Gabel, 2005), but there is also evidence to the contrary (Kirschner, Sweller, & 
Clark, 2006). However, regardless of whether constructivist-based instruction is beneficial, the 
willingness to incorporate constructivist-based learning signifies a greater inclination for 
differentiating instructional methods which tends to be related to more effective teaching 
(Subban, 2006). 
Rushton, Morgan, and Richard (2007) provide the only study to my knowledge that 
explicitly examines the relationship between individuals’ risk preferences and their effectiveness 
as teachers. They administered surveys to individuals who were nominated into the Florida 
League of Teachers, a prestigious group of educators nominated by their superintendents. Part of 
their survey included the Beiderman-Sensation Seeking Scale, a revised version of the 
Zuckerman Sensation Seeking Scale. Comparing these 58 teachers’ responses to the general 
population, they conclude that outstanding teachers are “not generally extreme risk takers” (p. 
436). However, when categorizing these teachers according to their responses and conducting a 
chi-square goodness of fit test, they do not find any significant differences between the 
distribution of risk preferences for this sample of effective teachers and that of the general 
population.  
There is also almost no research on the relationship between teachers’ perspectives of 
merit pay and how these views relate to their effectiveness as educators. Jensen (2012) 
interviews teachers who were participating in a newly implemented performance pay program, 




finding from this study is that teachers who earn higher ratings, as well as those who earn higher 
bonuses, are no more likely to support merit pay than teachers with lower ratings or bonuses.
13
   
I hope to add to this body of research by further investigating the relationship between 
pay and risk preferences to measures of teacher quality. Unlike the prior cited studies that 
examine teacher risk preferences through self-assessment surveys, I use the Holt and Laury 
(2002) experimental measure for eliciting risk preference. I also tie both pay and risk preferences 
to student achievement scores and principal evaluations as measures of teacher quality. These 
outcome measures have the advantage of being more continuous and tend to be more widely 
accepted measures of teacher quality (e.g. Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011; Hanushek & 
Rivkin, 2010; Rubin, Stuart, & Zanutto, 2004). 
Methods 
Task Procedures and Data Collection 
All the participants were employees at the time of this study at one of two school districts 
that had fairly recently implemented teacher performance pay programs. One district is a charter 
school district, and the other is a traditional public school district. In order to conduct the risk-
elicitation task and issue the survey, permission was obtained from the schools’ administrators to 
offer their teachers an opportunity to participate in a study about individuals’ economic decision 
making. Teachers participated in the study during lunch breaks, planning periods, or after 
students were dismissed for the day. The respective schools’ principals announced the 
opportunity to participate in the study shortly before the arrival of the research team and 
informed them of where to go if they were interested.  
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 During the study, as prospective participants arrived, a researcher would greet the 
teacher, briefly describe the experiment, and then ask if he or she would care to participate. 
Teachers were made aware that their participation was entirely voluntary and that they were free 
to leave at any point during the study. They were also told that they would receive compensation 
in exchange for their participation but that the amount they earned would depend on their 
decisions. Potential participants were also informed that the task would take approximately 15 
minutes. If the teacher still agreed to participate in the study,
14
 then they were handed a single 
sheet of paper that had the Holt and Laury (2002) task with instructions on the front and 18 
survey questions on the other side (see Appendix for the full set of instructions, the task itself, 
and the survey). 
 Teachers were instructed to first read through all of the directions. At the bottom of the 
risk task instructions, there was a comprehension question to verify that the participant 
understood how the task worked. The participants were instructed to notify the researcher after 
answering the comprehension question. The researcher would then ask the participant if there 
were any questions before proceeding. If the teacher was correct on the comprehension question, 
they were then asked to complete the task first and then answer the survey questions on the other 
side. If the teacher was incorrect, the researcher would ask the teacher to describe how they came 
to that answer and try to resolve any confusion they still might have even after eventually 
coming up with the correct answer to the comprehension question. The researcher would initial 
next to the each participant’s answer to the comprehension question. If the participant understood 
the task without any additional explanation, then the researcher initialed to the right of the 
answer. If the researcher provided any assistance in helping the participant comprehend how the 
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task worked, then the researcher would initial to the left of the answer to the comprehension 
question. Having the researcher indicate whether the participant needed any assistance makes it 
possible to document whether the participant may have been confused with the task while not 
bringing any unnecessary attention to the participant. After completing the survey, a researcher 
would verify that the participant did not leave any items blank and ensured that the teachers did 
not communicate with one another during the risk-elicitation task or survey.   
After a researcher checked the participant’s completed survey, a ten-sided die was rolled 
to determine by chance which of the ten lotteries would be used for determining the participant’s 
payment. Randomly using only one of the ten lotteries is a common approach for these types of 
experiments to control for wealth effects (e.g. Holt & Laury, 2002). After the first roll of the die, 
the participants were notified of which of the lotteries would determine their payout. Then, a 
second roll of the die determined whether the teacher received the higher or lower payout for 
their option for that particular lottery. Participants were then given an envelope with their 
payment in cash and then signed a form to verify receiving payment and were thanked by the 
researcher. The average payout for each participant ended up being $6.29 for fifteen minutes of 
time. 
Measuring Performance Pay Perspectives 
 Teachers were asked to provide their demographics and answer a few questions about 
their perspectives on performance-based pay. Three survey items were included specifically to 
elicit participants’ preferences for performance-based pay. Teachers were requested to indicate 
on a five-point Likert scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed about the following 
statement: “If I were looking to work in a different school, I would want to teach in a school that 




with a spectrum with which they could reveal their preferences for an ideal teacher compensation 
format. The first of these items has the teacher indicate the extent to which she would prefer pay 
based on student performance versus years of experience. The second item has the participant 
choose the extent to which he would prefer compensation based on individual versus team 
performance. 
 In order to create a scale for teachers’ preferences for performance-based pay I combine 
the responses to the items about working in a different school and the tradeoff between pay for 
student performance versus experience into a scale. I standardize the participants’ responses to 
both items, take the average of the standardized responses, and then standardize this average to 
compare the extent to which a teacher supports performance-based pay in terms of standard 
deviations. The compensation preference item for preference of individual versus team pay is not 
included in this scale since responses do not necessarily reflect the desire for performance-based 
pay as much as they reflect how participants would prefer to have performance measured. 
However, since an individual’s preference for pay based on individual performance could 
measure one’s sense of self-efficacy, I include specifications in the analyses that incorporate a 
standardized measure for participants’ responses to this survey item.
15
   
Measuring Risk Preferences 
Risk preferences are elicited from participants’ decisions from the Holt and Laury (2002) 
experimental procedure. This risk measure is a commonly used procedure in experimental 
economics (e.g. Anderson, Harrison, Lau, & Rutstrom, 2008; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde, 
2010; Eckel & Wilson, 2004). This risk-elicitation tool has the benefits of high test reliability 
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efficacy because teachers could still believe that they are very effective yet still prefer team-
based pay. For example, a highly effective teacher might believe that team-based pay promotes 




(Anderson & Mellor, 2008). This task has also been externally validated with surveys of an 
individual’s willingness to engage in risky behaviors (e.g. not using a seat belt, smoking, and 
heavy drinking) (Harrison, Johnson, McInnes, & Rustrom, 2005) as well as a psychometrically-
validated survey of financial risk tolerance (Faff, Mulino, & Chai, 2008). 
Study participants are asked to choose between two options, A and B, for 10 different 
lotteries. There are two payouts for each option. The payouts for each option are the same 
throughout the survey. Therefore, there were four total, possible payouts for the participants of 
this study: $4.80 or $6.00 for Option A; $0.30 or $11.55 for Option B.
16
 I define Option A as the 
“safer” of the two because the difference in the possible payouts is substantially lower than it is 
for Option B. 
As a participant proceeds from the first to the tenth lottery, the probability of being 
awarded the higher of the two payouts for a given option ($6 for A and $11.55 for B) increases at 
a consistent rate of 10 percentage points for each subsequent lottery. The participant has a 10% 
chance of obtaining the higher payout with the first lottery (a 90% chance of the lower payout), a 
20% chance in the second lottery (an 80% chance of the lower payout), and so on until the tenth 
lottery where the higher payout is guaranteed. Most participants will start off choosing Option A 
because they wish to avoid the high probability of getting only a $0.30 payout that comes with 
Option B in the earlier lotteries. The participant eventually switches to Option B at a point where 
the odds of getting the highest payout of $11.55 make this option preferable to the safer choice, 
Option A. 
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experiences with regard to the stakes that would typically be needed to efficiently maximize the 




The probability of getting the higher payout only increases as the participant goes 
through each of the 10 lottery choices. Therefore, after making the switch over to Option B, a 
participant who is consistent in their risk preferences should keep choosing B for the rest of the 
lotteries. Participants are told in advance that they will ultimately only be paid for the result of 
one of the ten lotteries and that this lottery would be determined randomly with the use of a ten-
sided die at the conclusion of the study. Therefore, while they only have the chance to be paid for 
their choice in one of the lotteries, they should treat each lottery as if it will ultimately end up 
being the one that determines their payout. 
Expected payouts for both options of each lottery can be calculated by multiplying each 
payout by the likelihood of obtaining that outcome and then summing these values. Comparing 
the expected payout value for each option within a lottery to participants’ lottery choices indicate 
their risk preferences. Option A has a higher expected payout than Option B for the first four 
lotteries, and Option B has the higher expected payout for the remaining lotteries. A risk-neutral 
participant makes choices based entirely on the expected payout for each lottery. Therefore, a 
risk-neutral participant chooses Option A for lotteries 1-4 and Option B for lotteries 5-10. 
Someone who is risk averse will favor the guarantee of getting at least $4.80 (or depending on 
how it is viewed, the assurance of avoiding the $0.30) beyond the fourth lottery even though the 
expected payout for Option B is greater than Option A. A risk-loving individual will switch to 
Option B before the fourth lottery because they find that the potential benefits of choosing the 
riskier option outweigh the difference in expected value plus any concerns that come with taking 
this risk. 
Participants’ responses on the Holt and Laury (2002) risk-elicitation task also provide 




likelihood of getting the higher payout only increases as the participant proceeds through the 
lotteries. Therefore, once a participant makes the switch from the safer option (A) to the riskier 
option B, they should not switch back and make the safer option in subsequent lotteries.
17
  
Measuring Teacher Quality 
I examine two available measures of teacher quality for this study. I obtained permission 
to collect the names of the teachers from the Bowen and Mills (2013) study and link their risk 
and survey responses to four years’ worth of two measures of teacher quality.  
The first measure is a teacher’s average value-added score over a four year period. 
Student achievement scores on the Northwest Evaluation Association’s (NWEA) Measures of 
Academic Progress (MAP) are used to compute these value-added scores. An advantage of the 
NWEA test scores is that students are tracked longitudinally and given growth targets based on 
prior growth and trajectories computed from normative data. Teachers’ value-added scores are 
determined by taking the average difference in students’ scores over the course of the year and 
dividing by their average projected score target to get a ratio of how well their students did 
relative to goal growth. Therefore, a teacher earns an NWEA value-added score of 1 if their 
students’ growth scores perfectly match their target scores. When included in analyses these 
scores were then standardized so that estimates for coefficients are presented in terms of standard 
deviation effect sizes. 
The second measure of quality is the teachers’ scores on their year-end performance 
ratings. This measure is almost entirely subjective because it is based on how the teacher’s 
principal rates them on matters such as content knowledge, level of performance, collegiality, 
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and how well they adhere to school policies and culture. The one objective element of the 
performance evaluation is the teacher’s attendance and punctuality. The score rating that the 
teacher receives is divided by the total number of possible points and then averaged across all 
years where the teacher has an evaluation on record during the performance pay program. These 
scores are also standardized so that estimates for coefficients are presented in terms of standard 
deviation effect sizes. 
Sample 
This study analyzes teacher quality measures for 93 of the 120 study participants from the 
Bowen and Mills (2013) study with either NWEA test score or principal evaluation data. Of the 
120 participants from the study, I am able to link 70 teachers to student test score data and 79 
teachers to principal evaluation scores.
18
 Almost half (47%) of the 120 teachers have both test 
score and principal evaluation data.  
An overview of the descriptive data for the sample is provided in Table 1. The majority 
of the teachers in the sample are employed at the traditional public school district (65%). The 
sample also consists of 43% teachers at the elementary level, 29% at the middle school level, and 
28% at the high school level. The average teacher has 12 years of experience, and experience 
ranges from 0 to 39 years. The vast majority of teachers are female (78%), as is common to the 
profession. 
The sample for this study consists of teachers who, on average, are probably considered 
effective based on their value-added scores. The average teacher’s value-added score in this 
sample is a 1.17, meaning that their average student scores 17% above their NWEA target score 
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subjects (e.g. social studies, foreign language, music, etc.). The primary reason for participants 
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for the school year. However, there is significant variation in this measure. The average student 
achievement at the teacher level relative to projected growth has a standard deviation of 0.57 
with ranges from -0.92 to 2.17. The measure for teacher performance is also generally positive 
and does not vary as much as the value-added score measure. The average teacher in this sample 
obtained 85% of the possible points available on the end of year evaluation and average teacher 
performance scores range from obtaining 55% to 100% of the points available.  
On average, teachers in this sample prefer to have their wages determined more by 
experience than student performance. However, these teachers are willing to have close to 50% 
of their salaries based on performance. Preferences for the weighting of student achievement 
varies, ranging from the desire to have pay based solely on teacher performance to pay based 
entirely on experience. Teachers from this sample, on average, are neutral on whether they 
would seek employment at another school offering merit pay. These teachers also tend to prefer 
performance being more dependent on individual rather than team effectiveness. However, they 
are willing to have close to 50% of pay determined by team performance. Objectively, this 
sample is considered risk averse, making 0.44 more safe choices than a risk-neutral group would 
make. Risk preferences range from individuals making 0 to 10 out of 10 possible safe choices. 
Empirical Strategy 
 I run multiple regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS) in order to control for 
observables that influence both measures of teacher quality. The controls used in all the 
regressions are a dichotomous variable for the teacher’s school district (charter or traditional 
public) and school grade level (elementary, middle, or high school). Controlling for district is 
important because of the charter versus public distinction that can influence student achievement 




place with students and teachers at these different levels in addition to the fact that there are 
different principals providing performance evaluations at the different school levels. I also 
include model specifications that incorporate teacher experience in terms of years and gender in 
addition to a dichotomous variable for whether the participant was consistent in lottery 
responses.   
Results 
I find a significant, negative relationship between a teacher’s stated preferences for pay 
based on student achievement and their value-added scores (see Table 2). Teachers scoring one 
standard deviation higher on the performance pay preference scale perform a fifth of a standard 
deviation lower on average in terms of students’ gain scores relative to projected growth (p-value 
= 0.09). There is also a positive relationship between the number of safe choices that a teacher 
makes (i.e. risk aversion) and students’ test score gains. One additional safe choice translates into 
a 0.06 standard deviation increase in students’ score gains relative to target growth. However, 
this relationship fails to reach a traditionally accepted level of statistical significance (p = 0.15).  
For the 79 teachers in the sample with year-end principal evaluations, both performance 
pay and risk preferences have no significant relationship to a teacher’s principal ratings (see 
Table 3). A standard deviation increase on the support for merit pay scale is related to a 0.13 
standard deviation increase in a teacher’s year-end performance evaluation (p = 0.21). Moreover, 
making one additional safe choice is associated with a 0.04 standard deviation increase on the 
teacher’s year-end performance evaluation (p = 0.29). However, neither of these estimates is 
statistically different from a null effect. 
The preference for individual, as opposed to team, performance-based pay has no 




same is true for the number of years of teaching experience and whether the participant was 
consistent throughout the Holt and Laury (2002) task. Teaching at the high school is 
significantly, negatively related to students’ gain scores relative to targeted growth. This result 
for high school teachers is likely attributed to the fact that there are curvilinear growth patterns; 
high school students’ achievement scores are typically much more static than is the case for 
elementary students (Lee, 2010). While NWEA targets account for this with lower projected 
growth scores for high school students, the gains still appear to more regularly fall short of 
expectations.  
Another interesting result is that females, on average, receive significantly higher 
performance evaluation scores. The male teachers in this sample receive 76% of the points 
possible in their year-end evaluations, and female teachers receive 83% of the year-end 
evaluation points. This result has been found in other research. Rinehart and Young (1996) 
examine whether there is a gender bias in teacher evaluations. They conclude that female 
teachers receive significantly higher ratings on professionalism and instruction. This effect could 
be attributed to female teachers simply performing better on these metrics or due to principals’ 
perceptions. 
Discussion & Conclusion 
 Finding evidence that teachers’ desires for performance-based pay is negatively related to 
their effectiveness in terms of how well their students perform is intriguing. Teachers who are 
more effective in terms of value-added scores would seemingly have the most to benefit from a 
merit pay system. It is unlikely for the teachers in this sample to not have a good understanding 




received student data and performance bonuses that reflected their effectiveness in the 
classroom. 
One possible explanation for this relationship might have to do with a teacher’s 
motivation for entering the profession. Teachers who do not want their salaries tied as much to 
student performance could be more intrinsically and mission-oriented, and individuals with this 
type of motivation probably have positive influences on student outcomes. Conversely, teachers 
who support performance-based pay might do so because they view it simply as an opportunity 
to make higher salaries, and teachers with this view are plausibly less effective than the more 
intrinsically and/or mission-oriented teachers.
19
  
 The behavioral economics research on the relationship between external reward and 
motivation provides evidence for this explanation. In a widely cited study, Deci (1971) 
concludes that “when money is used as an external reward for some activity, the subjects lose 
intrinsic motivation for the activity” (p. 114). Moreover, Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) in a 
meta-analysis on the influence of incentives on motivation, conclude that the general finding on 
the use of rewards for signaling degrees of competence is that they tend to have very negative 
impacts on intrinsic motivation. Individuals often become resentful of these types of reward 
structures, finding them to be overbearing means for controlling employee behavior in addition 
to being negatively, rather than constructively, construed forms of feedback (p. 657). 
 Teachers are still financially compensated as educators under the more traditionally used 
step and lane pay format. However, the format of this compensation does not explicitly attempt 
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 It is worth noting that the average teacher in this sample would likely be deemed “effective” 
with regard to student growth scores. The average teacher in this sample produces student gains 
that are 17% higher than their targeted growth. Therefore, I am not claiming that teachers who 
support performance-based pay are objectively ineffective, just that they appear to be less 




to motivate teachers to work harder to improve student outcomes. Educators who have more of a 
mission focus or are intrinsically motivated already maximize their efforts in the classroom. 
These teachers could conceivably acquire distaste for performance-based pay because the 
financial incentives are somehow perceived to diminish the value of their efforts. Weiber, Rost, 
and Osterloh (2010) conclude that pay for performance appears to have a crowding-out effect for 
individuals who more likely find their work to be more intrinsically rewarding. 
 Another explanation for this finding is possibly understood by considering the inverse of 
this result: teachers who prefer the more traditional step and lane pay are more effective when it 
comes to students’ growth scores. A logical explanation for why this might be the case is that 
teachers who believe in rewarding experience see themselves as staying in the profession longer, 
and this motivation is positively related to student achievement. This finding corroborates with 
earlier findings that more effective teachers, in terms of value-added score measures, are actually 
less likely to leave the profession (Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2007; 
Goldhaber, Gross, & Player, 2010; Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, & Rivkin, 2005; Krieg, 2006).
20
  
The fact that risk aversion and student performance are positively related could also 
support this finding. Bowen and Mills (2013) find that teachers with more teaching experience 
tend to be more risk averse. This finding makes sense because individuals who likely remain in 
the same career for a longer period of time are less likely to be risk takers. While risk aversion in 
and of itself does not likely explain teacher effectiveness, risk preference might relate to 
characteristics that increase the likelihood of an individual wanting to stay in the profession 
longer.    
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 Feng and Sass (2008) and West and Chingos (2009) however add an important caveat that 
even though the teachers with, on average, higher value-added scores are more likely to remain 
in the profession, exit rates for teachers on both the high and low end of the distribution are 




 Other aspects of teacher motivation that might influence perceptions of performance-
based pay could have to do with a concern for the welfare of students. The explanation here is 
still that exceptional teachers are more mission oriented and/or intrinsically motivated, but this 
interpretation just comes from a different angle. More effective teachers might believe that even 
if performance pay provides them with greater financial rewards, such a policy could still 
ultimately have negative effects for students. These teachers might associate performance pay 
with something such as the negative aspects of “teaching to the test”. Jensen (2012) supports this 
explanation, concluding that teachers employed at schools with performance-based pay become 
increasingly worried about the program’s impact on students’ outcomes; “There was a notable 
decrease in the percentage of teachers who thought the CPIP [performance pay program] 
improved educational outcomes for students, from 49% agreement in March to 37% agreement 
in October” (p. 116). These concerns are reflected in a decline in the belief that performance pay 
would increase student learning and an increase in the view that the program negatively affected 
students’ levels of stress and anxiety. 
 These findings, however, are still very much preliminary. In order to get a better sense of 
the causal relationship between teachers’ preferences and effectiveness, there needs to be larger-
scale, more rigorous studies on this issue. One question worth further exploring is a more direct 
evaluation of the relationship between teachers’ motives for entering the profession and how 
these motives affect student achievement. A similar, related issue is whether certain schools 
more effectively attract individuals with motivations that essentially translate into better student 
outcomes. Policymakers and researchers should also test whether adopting or eliminating 
particular education policies have long-term impacts on the composition of the teacher 




Hopefully these analyses provide at least a glimpse into how pay and risk preferences 
might influence teacher quality and produce testable hypotheses for future research. This line of 
research could have major implications for the design and implementation of policies that aim to 
improve teacher quality. If individuals with more of a mission focus are found to be more 
effective educators, then policymakers should find ways to best attract and retain individuals 
with a genuine passion for teaching. Conversely, there could be cause for concern with regard to 
policies that dissuade more mission-focused and intrinsically-motivated individuals from 
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Teacher Quality Measures    
Student Achievement 1.17 
(0.57) 
-0.92 2.17 
Performance Rating 0.85 
(0.09) 
0.55 1.00 
Performance Pay     
Prefer Pay Based on Student 









Prefer Pay Based on Individual 




Risk Preference    
# of Safe Choices 4.44 
(2.45) 
0 10 
Teaching Experience 12.4 
(10.3) 
0 39 
School    
Traditional Public 0.65 0 1 
School Level    
Elementary 0.43 --- --- 
Middle 0.29 --- --- 
High 0.28 --- --- 
Female 0.78 0 1 
    
N 93 --- --- 
Note: Standard deviations presented in parentheses. For the first performance pay measure a 
participant would get a 7 for indicating a preference for pay based 100% on student 
performance, a 4 for 50% student performance and 50% experience, and a 1 for 100% based on 
teacher experience. For the second pay measure a 5 is given for “Strongly Agree” and a 1 for 
“Strongly Disagree”. The third measure is scored such that a 7 represents the desire for 
performance pay based entirely on individual efforts, a 4 for 50% team and 50% individual, and 





Table 2: Teacher Pay and Risk Preferences and Student Value-Added Scores 






































      















































N 70 70 70 70 70 
R-Squared 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.16 
Note: Numbers in parentheses below coefficient estimates are standard errors. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% p-value levels, respectively, in a two-











Table 3: Teacher Pay and Risk Preferences and Year-End Performance Evaluations 






































      















































N 79 79 79 79 79 
R-Squared 0.25 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Note: Numbers in parentheses below coefficient estimates are standard errors. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% p-value levels, respectively, in a two-








Note: Actual document was formatted to take up the front and back of only one page. 
Please complete this page first, then proceed to the back to complete the study.  Upon 
completion you will be paid in cash for your participation as described below.  
For each of the 10 lottery pairs listed below, please indicate if you would prefer Option A or 
Option B by inserting a check mark in the  column. Please select only 1 option, either A or 
B, for each lottery. 
In each lottery pair you will be selecting between a lottery that will pay either $6.00 or $4.80 
(Option A) and a lottery that will pay either $11.55 or $0.30 (Option B).  In the first lottery 
there is a 10% chance of receiving the larger payout for lottery 1 and a 90% chance of 
receiving the smaller amount. In each subsequent lottery pair the chance of earning the 
higher payout increases by 10%.     
After you complete this study, the experimenter will roll a 10-sided die to randomly select 
which lottery will be used.  
Next, the experimenter will roll the same die a second time to determine your actual payoff 
based on the option you chose for that particular lottery.  
The number on the die for the second roll will determine whether you receive Payout 1 or 
Payout 2.  
Example: If the experimenter's first roll is "3," then your payoff will based on Lottery 3.  If 
you chose Option B for Lottery 3 and the second roll is "1", “2”, or “3”, you will receive a 
Payout of $11.55, but if the second roll is “4”, “5”, “6”, “7”, “8”, “9” or “10”, you will 
receive a Payout of $0.30.   
Please answer the following question which will not impact your payoff but is intended to 
ensure you understand this task. Suppose the experimenter rolls a "2" first and then rolls a 
“9”.  If you have selected Option A for Lottery 2, what will your payout be? __________  
Please notify the experimenter when you have answered this question before you continue 






Lotteries.  For each of the 10 lotteries listed below, please indicate if you would prefer Option A 
or Option B by inserting a check mark in the  column. Please select only 1 option per lottery. 
 
Lottery 
Option A Possible Roll(s) for 
Payout 
Option B 
 Payout Payout  
1.  
$6.00 1 $11.55 
 
$4.80 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
2.  
$6.00 1,2 $11.55 
 
$4.80 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
3.  
$6.00 1,2,3 $11.55 
 
$4.80 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
4.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4 $11.55 
 
$4.80 5,6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
5.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5 $11.55 
 
$4.80 6,7,8,9,10 $0.30 
6.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6 $11.55 
 
$4.80 7,8,9,10 $0.30 
7.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 $11.55 
 
$4.80 8,9,10 $0.30 
8.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 $11.55 
 
$4.80 9,10 $0.30 
9.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 $11.55 
 
$4.80 10 $0.30 
10.  
$6.00 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $11.55 
 







1. Year of Birth: _____________   
 
2. Gender (please circle):      Female         Male   
 
3. Race/Ethnicity (please circle):  White       Black       Asian       Hispanic        
 
        Other (please specify): ______________________________ 
 
4. Undergraduate Degree (please specify field and degree):_____________________________ 
 
5. Undergraduate Institution:______________________________________________________ 
 
6. What is your mother's highest level of education? (please circle) 
 
    Less than H.S.        H. S.        Some College        Bachelor's Degree        Graduate Degree     
 
7. What is your estimated annual household income? (please circle) 
 
Less than $35k        $36K-$50k        $51k-65k        $66k-80k        $81k-$95k        $96k-$110k    
 
$111k-$125k        Greater than $125k 
 
8. How many years total have you taught prior to this school year? __________ 
 
9. What is your primary teaching subject? ____________________________________________ 
 
10. Did you participate in this school’s performance pay program? (please circle)     Yes         No 
 
11. If you participated in the performance pay program, were you employed at this school before 
it began? (please circle)   Yes       No           
 
For #12-15, please indicate how you feel about the following statements: (please circle) 
 
12. The performance pay program was the deciding factor for me working at this school.  
     
   Strongly Disagree            Disagree          Neutral          Agree       Strongly Agree               N/A 
 
13. If I were looking to work in a different school, I would want to teach in a school that offered 
teacher performance pay.   
     






14. I believe that teachers should be paid based on student performance. 
    
      Strongly Disagree               Disagree               Neutral               Agree               Strongly Agree 
 
15. I plan to spend the rest of my career as a teacher. 
     
     Strongly Disagree               Disagree               Neutral               Agree               Strongly Agree 
 
On the scales below, please indicate how you, as a teacher, would prefer to be compensated.  
 
 16.                                
 
100% Student Performance                                     50/50                       100% Teacher Experience 
 
17.                                                   
 
100% Just My Performance                                     50/50                        100% Team Performance 
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Summary of Results 
Research Question 1: Are teachers more risk averse? 
Based on the findings of the first study, there appears to be a significant relationship 
between the decision to enter the teaching profession and risk aversion. This finding confirms a 
stereotype that is often attributed to teachers. This finding along with prior research on public 
sector employees suggests that low-risk, more predictable compensation formats are likely 
responsible for attracting more risk-averse individuals. Moreover, it does not appear as though 
socialization is likely the reason for teacher risk aversion. The first study finds that individuals 
entering the profession are more risk-averse than graduate students entering other professions. 
The results of the second study include an interesting finding with regard to the significant, 
positive relationship between years of teaching experience and risk aversion. While this 
relationship could be used to argue the case for socialization facilitating risk aversion, it is also 
reasonable to expect that this relationship exists in other professions. In other words, the decision 
to remain in the same profession for an extensive period of time probably reflects a life decision 
that is not unique to the teacher workforce. 
 
Research Question 2: Does performance pay attract more risk-loving individuals to the 
profession? 
 The evidence from the second study is mixed and fairly inconclusive. The first set of 
analyses in the second study identifies teachers as having opted in to a performance pay program 
if they were hired with the program in place. The results that use this definition as the means for 




no significant impact on the composition of the workforce. However, it can be argued that these 
“opt in” teachers may not have seriously considered performance-based pay in their employment 
decision. In order to get a better sense of whether a strong desire for performance pay 
significantly predicts risk preferences, at least at the time of employment, a second set of 
analyses that incorporated participants’ survey responses were conducted. These results do not 
affirm the results from the first set of analyses. Rather, using this alternative criterion for 
determining whether a teacher was seeking performance pay appears to confirm the notion that 
individuals who claim to have based their employment decisions on the performance-based pay 
format are indeed more risk loving. However, with there being so few participants indicating this 
intention (11% of the sample), these results remain fairly inconclusive. 
 
Research Question 3: Are teachers’ pay and risk preferences related to teacher quality? 
Probably the most intriguing finding from this research is the main result from the third 
study that teachers who are attracted to performance-based pay are less effective than teachers 
who are more opposed to working under this compensation format. This result is counterintuitive 
because the most effective teachers have the most to gain, at least financially, under a 
performance-based pay system. This finding probably cannot be dismissed on the grounds that 
the teachers were simply unaware of their effectiveness. Most of the teachers in this sample have 
at least a few years of feedback for how well they perform in terms of student achievement. One 
possible explanation for this finding could be that more effective teachers are more mission 
driven and/or intrinsically motivated and this unobserved characteristic negatively influences 




Teachers who are more risk averse also appear to be more effective in terms of students’ 
learning gains. However, this effect does not achieve traditionally accepted levels of statistical 
significance. The other measure of teacher quality, principal ratings on year-end performance 
evaluations, is not found to be significantly related to either teachers’ pay or risk preferences.  
Limitations 
 There are some noteworthy limitations to these studies. First and foremost are the 
concerns with regard to the sample sizes of these studies. While the sample sizes are fairly 
reasonable when compared to other studies of this nature, it is still important to keep in mind the 
limitations with regard to the generalizability of these results.  Aside from sample size, there is 
also the general concern with regard to the representativeness of the two samples. The first 
sample consists entirely of graduate students enrolled at one university. Also, the comparison 
group of this study is confined to MBA and law school students; a broader set of prospective 
professionals would provide a more comprehensive comparison group. The sample for the 
second and third studies is confined to teachers employed at one of two school districts; one of 
which is a charter district and the other is a relatively rural, traditional public school district that 
was willing to implement a performance-based pay program. Therefore, these districts and the 
teachers who work at these schools probably have unique, unobserved characteristics that have 
not been fully taken into account in these analyses. Replication of these studies in different 
settings would help to determine whether these results are indeed more generalizable. 
 Another limitation to these studies is the inability to determine causal relationships 
between teachers’ characteristics and preferences. The first and third study results are entirely 
based on descriptive statistics. Although there are significant relationships between occupational 




interact is not conclusive, at least based solely on the results from these studies. For example, the 
results of the third study cannot prove definitively whether a characteristic that influences 
teachers’ perspectives of performance pay makes them more effective in the classroom or if this 
relationship works in the opposite direction.  
The design of the second study provides the opportunity to get closer to making a causal 
argument by taking advantage of the relatively exogenous implementation of the performance 
pay program, in the fact that there was a sharp discontinuity in the type of compensation format 
being implemented at the school districts. However, there are still at least three major limitations 
to this study. One limitation is the extent to which the desire for performance-based pay is 
appropriately identified. The study attempts to get around this issue by running analyses with 
two definitions for teachers having chosen to work under performance-based pay. The fact that 
the results are different depending on which definition is used make it difficult to know with any 
certainty which result, if either, is more believable.  
The second issue is that there is likely substantial attrition of teachers who entered with 
performance pay in place and then left later for whatever reason. Some of these teachers may 
have exited because they did not care for the performance pay program; some may have exited 
because they decided they no longer wanted to teach for reasons unrelated to the compensation 
format. It is highly plausible that excluding these attriters significantly biases the results from 
this study; although the direction of this bias is unclear. Unfortunately, it is not possible to track 
down and administer the risk task and survey with these teachers.  
Finally, it would probably be more useful to have a measure of teachers’ interests in 
performance-based pay at the application or hiring phase of a teacher’s employment with the 




made several years ago. It is very likely that teachers’ perspectives of performance pay change 
with their experiences, and positive or negative experiences may produce a hindsight bias that 
prevents these participants from accurately recalling whether performance pay truly was or was 
not a deciding factor for their employment decision as well as whether they initially supported or 
opposed the program.  
Implications 
Despite the limitations of these studies, I believe that some of these results could have 
important policy implications. Probably the biggest implication or takeaway from these studies is 
that education policymakers should be mindful about the consequences regarding the potential 
impacts on the teacher workforce that stem from transitioning to a performance-based pay 
program. Individuals who go into teaching are relatively risk averse and, as a result, enacting a 
teacher performance pay policy could prove to be costly, both financially and politically. 
Furthermore, while changing the format of teacher compensation will likely attract a new crop of 
individuals to the profession, whether or not this reform improves teacher quality appears to be 
uncertain at best. At worst, performance-based pay could deter effective teachers from entering 
and remaining in the classroom. 
 If more mission-driven or intrinsically-motivated teachers are indeed more effective, then 
this finding could have additional education policy implications. Such a result would provide a 
case for further marketing and defining the job as a vocation more than a profession. This 
strategy would likely benefit from deemphasizing the importance of teacher wages and other 
financial benefits and focusing more on the altruistic, sacrificial nature of the occupation. 




addition to developing their own hiring criteria would also likely improve teachers’ abilities to 
select school environments where they are likely to exhibit greater efficacy.   
 I also hope that two additional implications from these studies can be drawn from the 
general methodological approaches incorporated in this research. I hope that one of the potential 
implications taken from this dissertation is that more controlled, laboratory-based research is 
seen as having value in its application to education policy research.. The other potential 
implication I hope for is that this research might serve as an example for the benefit of 
incorporating tools and methodological approaches from other disciplines into education policy 
studies. I do not wish to imply that these studies are the first to incorporate such methodologies. I 
also do not wish to remotely suggest that these studies are in anyway revolutionary in terms of 
their impacts on the future of education policy research. However, I hope that these studies can 
simply serve as examples for the potential benefits of incorporating interdisciplinary research 
techniques and the use of experimental measures in education policy, especially when field 
studies are unfeasible or a research question dictates the need to collect outcome measures that 
are not available in preexistent datasets.   
 
 
